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THE INTERSTATE LAND SALES FULL DISCLOSURE
ACT: AN ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES
IMPLEMENTED IN THE YEARS 1968-1975
A pair of observers remarked in 1969 that the Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act' might well be "the best kept secret of the century."'2 The
observation was ironic, for the purpose of the Act, as evidenced by its
title, is full disclosure. Although its existence is no longer unknown, the
practical administration of the Act by the Office of Interstate Land Sales
Registration (OILSR) nevertheless remains an enigma to many parties.
This article will review decisions rendered under the Act during the last
six years and will analyze current administrative policies within the context
of the Act's statutory mandate.3
I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME: AN OVERVIEW
A. The HUD Filing
The Act's sole purpose is to prevent fraudulent sales of subdivided
land by providing full disclosure of facts, and by rendering deceptive sales
practices actionable. The heart of the scheme is embodied in section 1703
of the Act, which prohibits sales of subdivided land unless, prior to sale, a
statement of record is in effect and a property report has been provided to
the purchaser. Violation of either condition renders the sale voidable.
The statement of record is a comprehensive report about the subdivision
and the developer. To be effective, the statement must be filed in proper
form and contain properly documented information. The property report
is an abstract of the statement of record. OILSR's administrative respon-
sibility is to determine whether the format and documentation requirements
are met. OILSR has no authority to regulate the merits of any offering.
Thus, for example, a development may violate local health regulations, but
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1970).
2. Coffey & Welch, Federal Regulation of Land Sales: Full Disclosure Comes Down
to Earth, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 5, 70 (1969).
3. This article provides an analysis of enforcement policies and remedies. The
topics of jurisdiction, exemptions, and remedies are given primary treatment. For a
comprehensive discussion of the Act's history, mechanics, and legislative alternatives,
see Coffey & Welch, supra note 2.
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its statement of record can still be effective if the violation is disclosed.
Once submitted, a continuing duty exists to amend any filing whenever
changed circumstances render its representations inaccurate.
Assuming the property report is actually read, it achieves two consumer
purposes: it provides the knowledgeable consumer with a convenient source
of information, and it suggests to unknowledgeable purchasers pertinent top-
ics for consideration. However, the excessive length of the report, including
verbatim inclusion of detailed financial reports,4 discourages consumer read-
ing.
B. Advertising Regulations
In addition to requiring full disclosure, HUD regulations also mandate
fair disclosure.5 Regulation 1715.5 prohibits any promotional statements
that materially differ from any OILSR disclosure filing and further prohibits
any false or misleading advertising. The latter prohibition is defined by 40
standards and guidelines published in regulation 1715.15.6 Three themes
permeate the guidelines. First, advertising must be complete, with no mate-
rial omissions.7 Second, all claims and representations must be specific and
accurate." Third, "[a]ny inference reasonably to be drawn from advertising
or promotional material will be considered to be a positive assertion" unless
it is clearly negated.9 Thus, the truth of the implication must be reasonably
guaranteed.10 This last requirement is particularly problematic, for it re-
quires developers to anticipate every reasonable inference any buyer could
make. The guidelines do not advise how or where the negation of inferences
should be accomplished. Regulation 1715.10 further requires the printing
of a disclaimer upon all printed advertising material and upon certain classi-
fied advertisements."' The balance of the regulation prohibits a variety of
4. See, e.g., Property Report for Deerfield Plantation, Inc., OILSR No. 0-2706-46-53,
pt. 1, containing 63 pages, 20 pages of which are financial documents.
5. 24 C.F.R. § 1715 (1976).
6. For a comprehensive discussion of suggested procedures for complying with
these guidelines, see Martin, Advertising Guidelines Under the New OILSR Regulations,
1 LAND DEV. L. REP. at E-100.
7. For example, section 1715.15(1) prohibits use of the phrase "guaranteed refund"
unless the refund is unconditional.
8. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 1715.15(k) (1976), which provides that "use of maps to
show proximity to other communities is prohibited unless such maps shall be drawn to
scale and scale included, or the specific road mileage appears in easily readable print."
9. 24 C.F.R. § 1715.15(ij) (1976).
10. For example, the word "homesite" implies that the "lots are immediately usable
for such purpose without any further improvement or development by the prospective
purchaser and that there is an adequate potable water supply available." Id.
11. The disclaimer provided in the regulation states: "Obtain the HUD Property
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specific advertising practices. 12
OILSR's policy is to treat the standards as substantive requirements
rather than as mere "guidelines. '13  Few developments have occurred in
the enforcement of the advertising regulations, however, partly because
regulation 1715.5 (b) provides only for the ponderous remedies of indictment
and injunction, and for the innocuous remedy of conducting investigations.
Consequently, OILSR's practical enforcement sanctions are blustery but
toothless warnings. 14
C. Environmental Impact Statement
A possible conflict between the disclosure requirements of the National En-
vironmental Protection Act (NEPA) 15 and the Interstate Land Sales Act
came to a head in Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Associa-
tion.'6 Scenic Rivers sought an injunction to suspend the effective date of a
disclosure statement filed with HUD by the developer, pursuant to OILSR
regulations, pending compliance with the NEPA provision requiring the filing
Report from developer and read it before signing anything. HUD neither approves the
merits of the offering nor the value, if any, of the property." Id. § 1715.10(a)
(1976). For discussion of practical problems and solutions in administering this re-
quirement, see Martin, supra note 6. In some instances, the results of failure to provide
the disclaimer have been severe. For example, in Pebble Lake, OILSR No. 0-2770-02-
570, OILSR demanded destruction of 50,000 expensive nonconforming brochures. Inter-
view with Rex Glaspey, Chief of Western Enforcement Branch, OILSR, in Washington,
D.C. (Sep. 3, 1975).
12. Of special interest is regulation 1715.25, which prohibits the provision of a prop-
erty report "along with other materials when this is done in such a manner as to conceal
the property report from the purchaser." This regulation aims at preventing the practice
of heaping upon the purchaser at closing a ream of brochures and documents. The
regulation requires proof of a specific intent, however, thereby imposing severe eviden-
tiary burdens upon a prospective plaintiff.
13. Interview with Rex Glaspey, supra note 11.
14. See, e.g., Letter from John McDowell, Deputy Administrator, OILSR, to Bar-
bara Nordeen (Jul. 31, 1975), Holmes Harbor, OILSR No. 0-3930-56-112, in which the
developer was ordered to cease publication of an advertisement which omitted the re-
quired HUD disclaimer. Additional sanctions may be available in certain circumstances,
however. Should a developer fail to cooperate in an investigation, for example, his filed
statement may be summarily suspended. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.45(b) (2) (1976).
In at least one case, OILSR has suspended a statement of record for advertising viola-
tions. See HUD News, May 29, 1973, reprinted in 1 LAND DEV. L. REP. at E-67.
OILSR suspended the filing essentially because the developer had not disclosed facts as
they were advertised. Interview with Rex Glaspey, supra note 11. As this basis for
suspension is not listed in section 1710.45, however, the action appears to have been
beyond OILSR's statutory authority. See also 1 LAND DEv. L. REP. at D-132, which
discusses Hills v. Omega Properties, Civil No. 75-280 (M.D. Fla., June 19, 1975) and the
issuance of injunctions for violation of advertising standards and guidelines.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
16. 96 S. Ct. 2430, petition for reh. denied, 97 S. Ct. 198 (1976).
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of an environmental impact statement because of possible ecological damage
to a nearby river. Two issues were before the Supreme Court. First, the
Court was asked to decide whether allowing a disclosure statement to take ef-
fect was a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment within the meaning of NEPA.1" Second, even if a major federal
action were involved, HUD contended that it would be exempt from filing
an environmental impact statement because compliance with NEPA was im-
possible since HUD was also required to comply with the Interstate Land
Sales Act's provision that a statement of record must become effective within
30 days of filing.' 8 The Court never reached the federal action issue, how-
ever. Instead, it held that even if HUD's action were a major federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment which normally
would require an environmental impact statement, in this case, because of
the clear conflict between the two statutes, NEPA would give way to the
Interstate Land Sales Act's disclosure requirements and NEPA's impact state-
ment requirement would not apply.19
II. ELEMENTS OF STATUTORY JURISDICTION
The most crucial determination in the administrative process is whether a
given subdivision is subject to the Act. Three issues are involved: whether
the subdivision has been promoted in interstate commerce, 20 whether the
development constitutes a "subdivision" containing "lots,'" 2 1 and whether the
subdivision consisted of 50 or more lots on or after April 28, 1969.22
Each of these three elements must exist in order to establish jurisdiction.
17. The NEPA provision referred to is at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
18. 96 S. Ct. at 2437. The district court had held that the NEPA requirement ap-
plied to HUD since the allowing of the developer's statement of record to become effec-
tive constituted a major federal action. 382 F. Supp. 69 (E.D. Okla. 1974). In affirm-
ing the Tenth Circuit agreed that it was such an action because there could be no
interstate sales from the subdivision without an effective statement. 520 F.2d 240 (10th
Cir. 1975). Further, the potential development of 3,000 homesites serviced by septic
tanks would significantly affect the environment. Failure to suspend this particular
statement was thus governed by NEPA. In addition, the court held that OILSR's 30-
day rule for statement clearance, 24 C.F.R. § 1710.21(a) (1976), was not inherently
incompatible with NEPA. Even though compliance with NEPA required a minimum
of 75 days, suspension of the statement pending compliance with the Act was the proper
procedure. So construed, the acts were entirely consistent, even complementary. 520
F.2d at 245.
19. 96 S. Ct. at 2437-38.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (1970).
21. Id. § 1703(a)(1).
22. By definition, a "subdivision" contains 50 or more lots. 15 U.S.C. § 1701(3)
(1970); 24 C.F.R. § 1710.1(q) (1976). The Act was passed on August 1, 1968, and
became effective on April 28, 1969. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.1(a) (1976).
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A. Promotion Through the Means of Interstate Commerce
Since federal regulatory authority over land is derived from the commerce
clause, 23 promotion in interstate commerce is a condition precedent to any
OILSR assertion of jurisdiction. 24  Discussion of the law of interstate com-
merce within the land sales context has centered largely on two topics: the
regulation of intrastate activities and the concept of indirect uses of the
jurisdictional means.
Intrastate Promotions. The threshold issue regarding intrastate promo-
tions is what quantum of involvement with the instruments of interstate
commerce is sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction. OILSR asserts that
minimal use of the means of interstate commerce, even minimal intrastate
uses, by a developer will suffice. 25  This position is based on two premises:
that Congress possesses the power to regulate intrastate activities and that
Congress has delegated this power to HUD. Since the first premise is ap-
parently settled, 26 the issue of delegation is paramount.
Section 1703(a) of the Act prohibits the "use of any means of transporta-
tion or communication in interstate commerce, or of the mails" in violation of
the statute. Due to the grammatical position of the modifying term "in inter-
state commerce," a literal reading of the Act indicates that Congress has
imposed two separate prohibitions: any use of the mails, interstate or other-
wise; and interstate uses of all other means or instruments of commerce.
Thus, to be prohibited, the use of "means or instruments," other than the
mails, must be "in interstate commerce. '"27
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
24. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (1970). See also Coffey & Welch, supra note 2, at
21.
25. In a letter to counsel for one subdivision, OILSR stated:
The Act provides, generally, that any subdivision of 50 or more lots is sub-
ject to jurisdiction if the developer or agent directly or indirectly makes use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or of the mails to sell or lease the lots. There is no statutory refer-
ence to interstate "activity." This means that any use of the telephone, the
mail or any newspaper (etc.) to sell lots in the subdivision would subject the
developer to the requirement to comply with the Act [unless otherwise exempt].
Letter from John McDowell to Sam Allgood, Esquire, Virginia City Subdivision (Mar.
20, 1975), OILSR No. 3-0821-09-41.
26. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 327 (1939); Krebs v. Fall River
Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 737-38 (10th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718
(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). A brief treatment of the develop-
ment of the commerce power, concluding that Congress has the power to regulate
intrastate uses of the means of commerce, is found in Light, The Federal Commerce
Power, 49 VA. L. REv. 717 (1963).




Since the statute possesses a facially plain meaning, no further analysis is
necessary.28 As added force, however, the secondary canons of statutory con-
struction also support this plain meaning. One secondary canon provides that
a statute copied from another statute must be construed consistently with con-
temporaneous judicial interpretations of the earlier enactment.29 In Myzel v.
Fields,3 0 the Eighth Circuit interpreted the jurisdictional phrase "instru-
ments of interstate commerce," contained in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,31 to include purely intrastate telephone conversations, and distinguished
it from the phrase "in interstate commerce," which excluded such transac-
tions a 2  Thus, the use of "in interstate commerce" in section 1703(a) im-
ports to Congress an intent to regulate only interstate uses of the means of
commerce.
3 3
Another secondary constructional canon, mandating that remedial statutes
be liberally construed to achieve their intended purpose, 34 appears to support
the opposite conclusion. This interpretation should be rejected, however,
because Congress clearly did not intend that the Act cover every sales trans-
action.3 5 Since Congress obviously did not intend to exercise its full plenary
powers, OILSR should not expand the Act beyond its facial limitation. On
28. See A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, A REVISION OF
THE THIRD EDITION OF SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTITUTION § 56.01 (C. Sands ed.
1973), citing Fullinwider v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 248 U.S. 409 (1919).
29. A. SUTHERLAND, supra note 28, §§ 52.02-.03.
30. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
32. 386 F.2d at 727 n.2. The court was relying on this distinction previously ac-
knowledged in Rosen v. Albern Color Research, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
Although the distinction may seem merely semantical, the Sixth Circuit has recently
adopted it in Aquionics Acceptance Corp. v. Kollar, 503 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1974).
33. One article has asserted that
although section 1404(a) [15 U.S.C. § 1703(a)] uses the term "in" inter-
state commerce, rather than the more encompassing words "of" or "affecting";
the operation of this language has not been limited to the use of interstate fa-
cilities across state lines. "Interstate commerce" . . . has been interpreted to
include the intrastate use of interstate facilities, such as an intrastate telephone
call ....
Coffey & Welch, supra note 2, at 22. In support, the authors cite Myzel. How-
ever, that position now appears incorrect in view of Aquionics and Myzel's reliance
on Rosen. See note 32 & accompanying text supra.
34. A. SUTHERLAND, supra note 28, § 70.01.
35. For example, Congress specifically refrained from asserting jurisdiction over sub-
divisions containing less than 50 lots. 15 U.S.C. § 1701(3) (1970). Congress further
created several statutory exemptions. Id. § 1702(a). This intent to assert less
than full jurisdiction distinguishes the Land Sales Act from the federal securi-
ties acts in which Congress intended to assert its full plenary powers to throttle fraud.
See Creswell-Keith, Inc. v. Willingham, 264 F.2d 76, 80 (8th Cir. 1959).
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balance, then, it appears that OILSR's jurisdictional policy is not supported
by its statutory delegation."6
To date, only one decision has been rendered on the jurisdictional issue. In
Wiggins v. Lynn,37 plaintiff Wiggins promoted lots through a variety of purely
intrastate means, including direct mail. From 1969 to mid-1973, only three
of plaintiff's 5,451 lots sold were bought by non-Texas residents. Wiggins
sought equitable and declaratory relief from OILSR enforcement action;
the government defendants counterclaimed to enjoin further sales pending
a registration. In denying Wiggins' request and granting OILSR's counter-
claim, the court merely recited the facts and issued bare legal conclusions.
Since the opinion did not indicate which specific activities rendered the
promotion subject to the Act, the underlying issue concerning interstate
commerce remains undecided. 8
Direct and Indirect Promotion. The second commerce issue, that of
OILSR jurisdiction over indirect uses of the means of commerce, presents
two questions. First, must OILSR, as a condition precedent to jurisdiction
over a given complaint, find that an individual sale involved interstate com-
merce, or need OILSR find only that some lots within the subject subdivision
-not necessarily the complainant's lot-were promoted in interstate com-
merce? OILSR has adopted the latter alternative.89
The second facet of the promotion problem is whether OILSR must find
that the actual consummation of a sale was accomplished through use of
the means of commerce for it to have jurisdiction. Apparently it need not.
The Act itself explicitly forbids direct and indirect use of any means of com-
merce. This sweeping prohibition would appear to proscribe any use of the
means of commerce to sell lots, including general advertising and preliminary
offers. Furthermore, numerous judicial constructions of the securities acts
have held that interstate commerce need only be used to "further" the sale
in order to support jurisdiction. 40
36. Indicative of HUD's position is the fact that OILSR uses the phrases "of inter-
state commerce" and "in interstate commerce" interchangeably. Compare Letters from
John McDowell to Eugene Hines (Jul. 31, 1975), Albee's Subdivision, OILSR No. 2-
1105-32-6 (of interstate commerce), with Letter from John McDowell to Edward Brown
(Jul. 30, 1975), Lake O' the Woods, OILSR No. 0-2114-49-99 (interstate commerce).
37. Civil No. B-74-90-CA (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 1975).
38. In significant dictum, another district court interpreted the Act to regulate use
of "'any means or instruments of interstate transportation or communication in inter-
state commerce.'" United States v. Del Rio Springs, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 226, 228 (D.
Ariz. 1975) (emphasis added), quoting 15 U.S.C, § 1703(a) (1970).
39. In pursuing administrative settlements for preeffective sales promotions, see
pp. 382-83 infra, OILSR does not distinguish between interstate and intrastate purchasers.
See OILSR Form Letters L, 0 and Q.
40. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Bentson, 203 F.2d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 1953) (returning
[Vol. 26:348
Interstate Land Sales
B. Lots and Subdivisions
A second jurisdictional element, that the lot is in a subdivision, requires
a finding that the realty offering is a "subdivision" within the statutory mean-
ing, and that "lots" are offered for sale. Each term possesses a specific
regulatory definition that creates numerous interpretational problems.
Definition of Subdivision. One standard definition of subdivision is "the
division of a particular subject or thing into smaller parts. '41  This defini-
tion is adopted by the Act, which defines subdivision as "any land ... which
is divided or proposed to be divided into fifty or more lots .... ,142 The
only interpretational problem occurs when lots are developed and sold piece-
meal. This can occur in one of two ways. Several hundred lots may
be platted, but marketed in consecutive blocks of less than 50, or a sub-
division of less than 50 lots may be created on the fringe of a large un-
developed tract of commonly owned realty. In both instances, the OILSR
position is that jurisdiction exists from the inception over any development
that ultimately will contain 50 or more lots. In the first case, the platting
of more than 50 lots is viewed as conclusive evidence of intent to exceed the
jurisdictional minimum. 43 In the second situation, OILSR presumes contigu-
ous lots are part of a common promotional scheme unless the developer
makes an affirmative statement that they are not.4 4
completed contracts to vendee by mail confers jurisdiction). Scholarly authorities con-
cur. See, e.g., 1 L Loss, SEcultrrIns REGULATION 209 (2d ed. 1961); Coffey & Welch,
supra note 2, at 22-23.
41. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1593 (4th ed. 1968).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1701(3) (1970); 24 C.F.R. § 1710.1(q) (1976).
43. See, e.g., Roseland Gardens, E-163-71 (Feb. 19, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0271-09-13,
reprinted in 1 LAND Dv. L. REP. at B-30 (developer platted 120 contiguous lots but
proposed to market them in units of 49 lots; all lots, including the initial unit, held
subject to the Act).
44. Interview with Alan J. Kappler, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regulatory
Functions, OILSR, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 9, 1977). In the past, however, that
policy has not been consistently followed. See, e.g., Commerce World on Puget Sound,
E-290-14 (May 16, 1974), OILSR No. 1-0454-56-10 (48 platted lots were contiguous
to an undeveloped tract owned by the developer, but sales literature and federal en-
vironmental impact statement announced intention to develop 300 additional lots. Juris-
diction was found to exist from the inception.); Starwood Subdivision, E-238-71 (Oct.
29, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0356-05-12, reprinted in 1 LAND DEe. L. REP. at B-40 (involv-
ing a subdivision of 49 lots that was adjacent to 76 acres of commonly owned un-
developed land). But see Arden Estates, E-202-71 (Jun. 2, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0318-
02-62, in which a developer platted 49 lots, sold and deeded 4 lots, and then acquired
a nearby noncontiguous lot. The development was considered exempt because "at no
time did the developer . . . own fifty or more lots which were offered as a common
promotional plan." One variation of this theme involves developers, often farmers,
who market unplatted tracts by metes and bounds. Depending on the future purchasers,
the developer may sell 1 lot or 100 lots. See, e.g., Bell Mountain Estates, OILSR No.
1977]
Catholic University Law Review
The statutory definition of subdivision contains additional interpretational
difficulties engendered by the phrase "common promotional plan." The
full statutory definition reads:
"Subdivision" means any land. . . which is divided or proposed to
be divided into fifty or more lots, whether contiguous or not, for
the purpose of sale or lease as part of a common promotional plan
and where subdivided land is offered for sale or lease by a single
developer or a group of developers acting in concert, and such land
is contiguous or is known, designated, or advertised as a common
unit or by a common name such land shall be presumed, without
regard to the number of lots covered by each individual offering,
as being offered for sale or lease as part of a common promotional
plan . . .45
Analytically, the statutory definition breaks into three component parts.
First, the contiguity of the lots is expressly deemed irrelevent. Second,
OILSR need only establish the existence of a common plan of promotion in
order to exercise jurisdiction over a given group of lots. Third, lots are
presumed to be commonly promoted whenever one of two alternative factual
conditions are found to exist: when all lots are owned by a single developer
or syndicate and all lots are contiguous, or when all lots are owned by a
single developer or syndicate and the lots are known, designated, or adver-
tised as a common unit or by a common name.
The Statutory Presumption. In interpreting this definition of subdivision,
OILSR has had to make judgments concerning the legal construction of the
statutory presumption and mixed factual-legal judgments of whether a
given group of lots was actually promoted in common. The threshold
legal issue is whether a common promotional plan is precluded if the terms
of the presumption are not strictly met. OILSR maintains that the condi-
tions stated in the statutory text are not exclusive. The cases of Jack Pine
Village46 and River Pine Estates47 are illustrative. Both subdivisions were
developed and promoted by the same developer-broker. Although they
had different names and were not contiguous, the promotion of the second
offering in each case began before all lots in the first subdivision were sold.
Although the presumptive language did not strictly apply, OLSR neverthe-
3-0568-49-176. See also Lake Anne Subdivision, E225-71 (Aug. 11, 1971), OILSR
No. 1-0335-48-6, in which OILSR declined to give a favorable Exemption Advisory
Opinion to a promotion in which the developer planned to offer less than 50 large
tracts, but where the developer also proposed to replat the subdivision into more than
50 16ts if the large tracts were not sold.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1702(3) (Supp. IV, 1974); 24 C.F.R. § 1710.1(q) (1976).
46. OILSR No. 2-0948-43-16.
47. OILSR No. 2-0729-43-6.
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less held that the two offerings constituted a common promotion. The agency
asserted that
in the absence of the elements necessary for a presumptive common
promotional plan, other characteristics are evaluated in determin-
ing whether a common promotion exists. These characteristics in-
clude: a thread of common ownership, any elements of common
promotion, common sales agents, common sales office, a close
proximity of location and the like.48
This "common thread" test is subject to several legal criticisms. First,
the policy violates the basic statutory interpretive canon expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.49 The "common thread" test further disregards both the
canon of interpretation mandating that jurisdictional statutes should be con-
strued narrowly against the government5" and OILSR's own regulatory defini-
tions. 51 The test is also subject to procedural criticism under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 52 which requires publication in the Federal Register of all
"statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formu-
lated and adopted by the agency," 53 OILSR only recently complied with this
statutory requirement, 54 even though most of its operational policies, includ-
ing the "common thread" test, have been in force for several years. Conse-
quently, OILSR's belated publishing may offer a possible defense to all de-
velopers not possessing actual knowledge of the rule prior to its publication.
Analytic Criteria For Determining A Common Promotion. Aside from
matters of statutory construction, OILSR must also determine from the
48. Letter from John McDowell to Donald V. McCallum, Esquire (Mar. 27, 1975),
River Pine Estates, OILSR No. 2-0729-43-6. See Letter from John McDowell to Mr.
B. J. Thomas (Jun. 2, 1975), Highland Country Estates, OILSR No. 3-1103-42-42. Com-
mon inventory is also a factor to be considered in determining whether a common pro-
motional plan exists. Id.
49. "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." See generally A. SUTHER-
LAND, supra note 28, § 47.23.
50. Id. § 64.01.
51. See id. § 47.07, where the author asserts that the definitional term "means" is a
term of limitation indicating that the following definition excludes all other definitions.
Conversely, the term "includes" is "more susceptible to extension of meaning by con-
struction than where the definition declares what a term 'means.'" Id. 24 C.F.R.
§ 1710.1(q) (1976), which deals with the issue of "common promotional plans," states
that "[s]ubdivision means any land .... " (emphasis supplied). This contrasts with 24
C.F.R. §§ 1710.1(m) & (p) (1976), which respectively employ the expansive terms
"refers" and "includes." This suggests, therefore, that under OILSR's own regulatory
definitions, there is little room for a liberal or expansive construction of the term "com-
mon promotional plan."
52. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970).
53. Id. § 552(a)(1)(D).
54. See 40 Fed. Reg. 47,166 (1975).
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facts whether a common promotional plan exists in each individual case.
The agency has recited four criteria: common elements of promotion,
distance between subdivisions, time sequence of promotion, and common
identity of ownership interest.
A "common element of promotion" is any promotional activity tending to
connect physically distinct offerings. There are two analytical subconcepts:
common advertising techniques55 and customer cross-referrals. 5" Common
advertising by definition includes media advertisements mentioning two sub-
divisions and directing potential buyers of different subdivisions to a common
sales agent. 57 Use of common sales personnel or sales offices, 58 and even
reliance by one subdivision upon the advertising of another nearby subdivision
to attract customers to the general area 59 has been characterized as common
advertising. Cross-referrals occur whenever potential customers attracted
to one subdivision are directed to lots at another subdivision. °
Geographical distance between subdivisions is a second criteria often men-
tioned in agency rulings. A review of OILSR decisions indicates that dis-
55. See, e.g., Letter from John McDowell to Mr. M. C. McGuffy, Jr. (Jun. 4, 1974),
Crescent Oaks, OILSR No. 4-0635-49-119.
56. See, e.g., Letter from John McDowell to Clark G. Thompson (Jul. 8, 1974),
Green Forest Estates, OILSR No. 3-0478-49-134.
57. Interview with John McDowell, Deputy Administrator, OILSR, in Washington,
D.C. (Nov. 14, 1975).
58. See, e.g., Letter to Donald V. McCallum, Esq., supra note 48; Antelope Hills
Second Subdivision, E-196-71 (Apr. 30, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0324-02-63, reprinted in
1 LAND DEv. L. REP. at B-54 (noncontiguous offerings, having common ownership and
sales personnel but different designations and sales clientele held to constitute common
promotion). Cf. Orange Grove Valley No. 1, E-175-71 (Mar. 4, 1971), OILSR No.
1-0280-02-44, reprinted in 1 LAND DEV. L. REP. at B-26 (use of local brokers to promote
a subdivision held not to constitute a common promotional plan when local brokers
had no connection with other subdivisions promoted by developer); Avra Valley Estates
Nos. 1 and 3, E-56-69 (Oct. 20, 1969), OILSR No. 1-0059-02-11, reprinted in 1 LAND
DEv. L. RE'. at B-70, and Park Valley Subdivision, E-204-71 (Jun. 23, 1971), OILSR
No. 1-0329-02-65 (two noncontiguous subdivisions with common ownership but separate
advertising and separate sales staffs held not in common promotion). But cf. Kimber-
land Tract, E-260-72 (Jul. 20, 1972), OILSR No. 1-0411-26-11, reprinted in 1 LAND
DEV. L. REP. at B-58 (122 lots located in 3 different states and in 17 different counties
were held not to be a subdivision despite a common promotion, common ownership, and
common sales personnel).
59. See Nimrod River Park 8th Addition, E-89-70 (Jan. 26, 1970), OILSR No. 1-
0057-43-2, reprinted in 1 LAND DEv. L. REP,. at B-14 (two contiguous subdivisions owned
by separate corporate entities were found under common promotional plan when cor-
porations had common shareholders, subdivisions had similar names, and one corpora-
tion did not advertise and planned to profit from advertising done by the other corpora-
tion).
60. Letter to Clark Q. Thompson, supra note 56,
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tant subdivisions tend not to be found in common promotion.a However,
a close reading of the facts indicates that common elements of promotion
existed whenever a common promotion was declared. It appears, therefore,
that geographical distance was not dispositive in these rulings. 62
A third oft-cited factor is concurrence of promotion. OILSR will not
find a common promotion where two promotions are clearly separated in
time, such as when every lot in the first subdivision is sold before any lots
within the second are promoted. 63 As suggested by River Pine Estates, this
rule is strictly applied. Within this context, "sale" is specially defined as a
transfer of legal title by the developer under conditions where legal title to the
lot could not revert to the developer. 64 Cash or third party-financed sales
would satisfy these conditions. However, when the developer takes back a
mortgage from the purchaser, or when the developer sells a lot under a
straight installment contract, it is possible for a lot to revert to the developer,
who may then repromote the lot after the inception of the second subdivision
promotion. Because a concurrent promotion is possible under these condi-
tions, OILSR will likely declare a common promotion. 6
The last of the four criteria recited in the context of common promotions is
identity of interest. This factor is relevant in three situations: when the
same developer operates two different subdivisions,66 when technically dis-
61. Contiguous subdivisions are, of course, presumed to be commonly promoted.
See, e.g., Ocean Reef Club, E-319-75 (Feb. 11, 1975), OILSR No. 1-0485-09-28. Sub-
divisions located one mile apart have been held to be a common promotion, Jack Pine
Village, OILSR No. 2-0948-43-16, whereas subdivisions separated by 30 miles were held
not to constitute a common promotion in Bisbee Tombstone Acres, Units 1 and 2, E-
107-70(A) (May 18, 1970), OILSR No. 1-0226-02-35, reprinted in 1 LAND DEV. L.
REP. at B-20. See also Orange Grove Valley, supra note 58 (subdivision owned in com-
mon with numerous other subdivisions throughout the world was held not to be a sep-
arate promotion).
62. But see Kimberland Tract, supra note 58. The offering in Kimberland Tract
consisted of 122 parcels located in 3 different states and 17 different counties, 24 lots
being created by plat. All parcels were owned by a single company and promoted by
common advertising and personnel. The offering was characterized as a "sale of
discrete parcels" not constituting a common promotional plan consisting of 50 or more
lots.
63. See, e.g., Letter from John McDowell to Stephen M. Ringhoffer (Jan. 16, 1975),
Straw Springs Addition, OILSR No. 4-3478-43-181.
64. See Sierra Vista Estates, E-42-69 (Aug. 22, 1969), OILSR No. 1-0053-02-9,
reprinted in 1 LAND DEV. L. REP. at B-113.
65. "The total lots, including reacquisitions, may well exceed . . . forty-nine lots
being involved in a common promotional plan." Id. However, this position may have
been undermined by Arden Estates, supra note 44, in which a developer had a subdivi-
sion which originally consisted of 49 lots of which he sold 4. When he acquired an
additional lot four miles away, it was not counted cumulatively.
66. A unique fact pattern, involving "satellite" lots, was encountered in River Pine
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tinct business entities operate different subdivisions but the entities share a
common identity of interest,67 and when a syndicate of developers pool their
respective lots to form a single offering. 68 In the first case the two offerings
possess by definition a common promoter;69 in the second, OILSR will
declare a common element of ownership to exist whenever the same person
or corporation owns 10 percent or more of each entity.70 The third situation
is rare.
Real estate brokers pose special problems within the context of collusive
activity since brokers deliberately act in concert with diverse individuals in
order to offer a wide variety of inventory. OILSR has suggested that the
use of brokers to sell lots constitutes collusive activity only when the diverse
developers agree to pool their lots into a single offering prior to retention of
a broker.71
Definition of Lot. The concept of "lot" is crucial in defining the Act's
boundaries. Lots are the individual units comprising a subdivision.72  The
common construction of the term is a portion of land having fixed bound-
aries. 73  The full regulatory definition74 expands upon the nontechni-
Estates. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra. In addition to the two conven-
tional subdivisions, the developer occasionally purchased and resold isolated lots (often
homes, commercial properties, or farms). Due to the common ownership and common
means of promotion, OILSR found the two subdivisions and the satellite lots to be
in common promotion. Letter to Donald V. McCallum, supra note 48.
67. See, e.g., Nimrod River Park 8th Addition, supra note 59; Bamboo Point,
E-209-71 (Jun. 16, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0322-10-4.
68. 40 Fed. Reg. 47,166 (1975). See also Hatteras Colony at Salvo Section D,
OILSR No. 2-0349-38-28 (when a developer partnership dissolves, distributes lots to
individual partners, and the individuals continue to promote the lots under a common
name, a common promotion exists); Interlaken, Inc., OILSR No. 2-0329-05-24 (dis-
solution of corporation and sale of lots to individual stockholders and officers may
also create a common identity). However, a bona fide arm's length sale will not result
in a common identity of interest. See Letter from John McDowell to Vincent Barth
(May 5, 1975, Lake Somerset), OILSR No. 1-0493-44-17.
69. See Meadows Fourth Addition, E-284-74 (Mar. 27, 1974), OILSR No. 1-0442-
42-5 (one member of a developer partnership also the sole developer of another non-
contiguous subdivision; common identity of interest found); Letter to Donald McCollum,
supra note 48. Cf. Antelope Hills, supra note 58.
70. Interview with John McDowell, supra note 57. The 10-percent figure is the
result of pure agency discretion. Id.
71. Cf. Orange Grove Valley No. 1, supra note 58 (if a developer retains a broker
to promote several commonly owned subdivisions, the broker would constitute a com-
mon sales agent).
72. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.1(q) (1976). See also Letter from Alfred Lehtonen, Admin-
istrator, OILSR (Aug. 20, 1972), reprinted in 1 LAND DEV. L. REP. at B-184.
73. WEBSTER's 7TH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 500 (1975); BLACK'S LAW
DIcioNeARY 1096 (4th ed. 1968).
74. "tot' means any portion, piece, division, unit, or undivided interest in land if
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cal concepts in two ways. First, a lot need not possess fixed bound-
aries.75  Second, the technical definition renders the Act applicable to other
forms of realty containing physical divisions70 in addition to the common
platted subdivision, such as condominiums and membership recreational
developments.
OILSR treats condominiums as a form of realty ownership. Since estates
in the structure can be created regardless of whether the structure has actu-
ally been built,77 unbuilt condominiums are considered equivalent to undevel-
oped land.7 8 This policy rests upon two assumptions: that each condominium
unit constitutes a lot, and that such offerings involve the promotion of land.T9
The first assumption is largely self-evident since the typical condominium
conveyance transfers a fee simple interest in a specific unit.80 The transfer of
additional bona fide undivided interests in realty and fixtures does not alter
this threshold fact.81 The second assumption is not nearly as self-evident,
but rests upon strong authority. OILSR's position is two-pronged. First, a
condominium is viewed as establishing separate living areas and, therefore, it
such interest includes the right to the exclusive use of a specific portion of the land."
24 C.F.R. § 1710.1(h) (1976).
75. For example, undeveloped recreational campsites having undefined boundaries
constitute lots. Memorandum from K. H. Sauerbrunn to John R. McDowell (Jun. 6,
1975) (on file at OILSR).
76. OILSR has conceded that Congress only delegated power to regulate divisions
of land. 38 Fed. Reg. 23,866 (1973). Therefore, genuine undivided interests in realty
are exempt from the Act. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.10(h) (1976); 38 Fed. Reg. 23,866 (1973).
See Snowflower, E-262-72 (Sep. 20, 1972), OILSR No. 1-0410-04-62, reprinted in 1
LAND DEv. L. REP. at B-71.
77. As a practical matter, the builders' exemption exempts most condominiums oth-
erwise subject to OILSR's jurisdiction. See pp. 366, 67 inira.
78. Tamarack Townhouses, E-57-69 (Oct. 28, 1969), OILSR No. 1-0063-05-5, re-
printed in 1 LAND DEV. L. REP. at B-86. See also 39 Fed. Reg. 7,824 (1974); 38 Fed.
Reg. 23,866 (1973).
79. Extrapolation of OILSR condominium policy indicates that OILSR has jurisdic-
tion over the promotion of preconstruction leases in any apartment and office complex
containing 50 or more units. OILSR also asserts jurisdiction over leases of lots exceed-
ing five years. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.13(b) (1976). Under the concept of common promo-
tion, jurisdiction exists whenever the developer proposes to promote 50 or more individual
rooms. Independently severable rooms would each constitute a lot regardless of whether
the rooms were combined and rented as suites. See Lake Meade Rancheros, E-1-69
(May 16, 1969), OILSR No. 1-10003-02-1, reprinted in 1 LAND DEv. L. REP. at B-61
(promotion of two platted 2%-acre lots constitutes the promotion of two lots). To date,
however, OILSR has not strictly exercised jurisdiction in this regard.
80. See N. PENNEY & R. BROUDE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND FINANCING 138
(1970).
81. See, e.g., Benchmark at Beaver Creek, E-317-74 (Jan. 6, 1975), OILSR No. 1-
0480-05-25, reprinted in 1 LAND DEV. L. REP. at B-240 (common promotion of 1,256
condominium units on 13 land parcels held to constitute a common promotion of 1,269
"lots").
1977]
Catholic University Law Review
necessarily divides the land.82 This argument incorrectly analyzes the prob-
lem. The core issue is whether the term "land" includes the adjacent airspace
above the earth or merely encompasses the conception of earthen soil. In a
multi-story condominium development, the purchaser receives a separate in-
terest in airspace and structural fixtures but shares an undivided interest in
the earth beneath the building.83 Consequently, if the term "land" encom-
passed only the concept of soil, OILSR would have no regulatory authority
over the condominium offering.8 4 The common law, however, viewed land as
a concept encompassed by metes and bounds extending infinitely above and
below the surface of the earth.85 Except in certain defined cases,88 this view
is still accepted.87 The theory of trespass corroborates this position. Although
trespass to real property is defined as "unauthorized entry upon the soil of
another,"' 8 violation of airspace has been held a trespass, regardless of
whether soil has actually been touched.8 9 Under common law theory, there-
fore, the condominium interest in airspace would constitute land.
The second OILSR argument is that "condominiums carry the indicia
...of real estate." 90 OILSR notes that state condominium enabling legisla-
tion "makes it clear that the property interest of the owner has all the charac-
teristics of real property."9' 1 There are two criticisms of this argument.
First, OILSR has previously rejected state attempts to define restrictively
OILSR jurisdiction. 92  It is inconsistent to rely upon state definitions merely
because they are self-serving. Second, the fact that special state legislation
establishes ownership rights in airspace does not determine the issue in the
context of a federal statute. If states possessed this power, they could uni-
laterally amend OILSR jurisdiction by legislative act, rendering it inconsis-
tent from state to state.
82. Letter from Alfred Lehtonen, supra note 72.
83. See N. PENNEY & R. BROUDE, supra note 80, at 138.
84. See 38 Fed. Reg. 23,866 (1973).
85. See generally 63 AM. JuR. 2d Property § 12 (1972).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Causey, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (air flights); Katz v.
Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903) (water rights).
87. See Pyramid Coal Corp. v. Pratt, 229 Ind. 648, 99 N.E.2d 427 (1951); Reynard
v. City of Caldwell, 55 Idaho 342, 42 P.2d 292 (1935); accord, BLACK'S LAW D1C'noN-
ARY 1019 (4th ed. 1968).
88. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 63 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis
added).
89. See, e.g., Puroto v. Chieppa, 78 Conn. 401, 62 A. 664 (1905) (eaves projecting
over property line held to be a trespass).
90. 38 Fed. Reg. 23,866 (1973).
91. Letter from Alfred Lehtonen, supra note 72.
92. See Letter from John McDowell to D. Scott Sandelin (Nov. 1, 1974), Lake Trask
Timber Trails, OILSR No. 0-4586-56-154.
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The promotion of recreational camping developments also poses unique
administrative problems, because often it is not apparent whether camping
clubs offer "lots" for sale. The initial step in determining which individual
promotions are subject to OILSR jurisdiction is to apply the regulatory defi-
nition of lot. Certain promotions, such as platted campsite lots, clearly fall
within the definition. 93  In less certain cases, however, OILSR views the
element of "exclusive use" as being decisive. 94 The existence of "exclusive
use" is liberally found. The possession of the right to eject another person,
even for a portion of a year, is deemed sufficient.95 A camping membership
entitling the purchaser to exclusive use of a campsite while the camping asso-
ciation reserves the right to move an individual from campsite to campsite,
and a membership by which the holder may exercise rights over a given lot
also appear to fall within this definition. The right of a camping association
to terminate a membership does not affect the right of exclusive use.96
When the right of exclusive use exists, it appears immaterial whether the
actual property interest conveyed to the purchaser is labeled a license or a
leasehold. Where the right to exclusive use attaches only when the member
affirmatively elects to purchase, jurisdiction exists over only those member-
ships for which the right was elected.9 7
A final interpretational issue is whether the simultaneous conveyance of
multiple contiguous platted lots to a single buyer constitutes conveyance of
multiple lots or one large lot. In such cases, OILSR has consistently treated
the conveyance as one of multiple lots.98 This policy appears analytically
sound for several reasons. First, the regulatory definition defines lot as a divi-
sion. By virtue of platting, the developer has effected a legal division of land
which continues despite any subsequent conveyances by metes and bounds.
93. Letter from John McDowell to Richard D. Nelson (Jan. 14, 1975), Birch Bay
Leisure Park, OILSR No. 4-1044-56-44.
94. See, e.g., Bahia De Santiago Yacht and Country Club, E-100-70 (Apr. 21, 1970),
OILSR No. 1-0168-60-1, reprinted in 1 LAND DEV. L. REP. at 159; Letter from John
McDowell to Herbert I. Lakefish, Esquire (Oct. 10, 1974), Skagit River Woods Camping
Country Club, OILSR No. 0-4570-56-162; Memorandum from K. H. Sauerbrunn, supra
note 75.
95. See Memorandum from K. H. Sauerbrunn, supra note 75.
96. See Letter from John McDowell to Arthur McKean, Esquire (Oct. 8, 1974),
Issaquah Highlands Camping Club, OILSR No. 4-1058-56-58; Letter to Herbert I. Lake-
fish, supra note 94.
97. Letter from John McDowell to Floyd J. Windsor (Jan. 8, 1975), Lake Curlew-
Trout Creek Recreational Area, OILSR No. 4-1042-56-42.
98. For example, in Lake Meade Rancheros, supra note 79, OILSR ruled that two
21/2-acre lots could not be treated as one 5-acre lot. Accord, Antelope Hills Second Sub-
division, supra note 58. In Antelope Hills, a conventional subdivision of 44 lots and a
separate subdivision of 14 lots were held to be a common promotion even though the
developer had specifically ordered the 14 lots to be sold in a single -transaction.
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A contrary interpretation would create incredible jurisdictional problems. For
example, jurisdiction could not definitely be established until after the
promotion was substantially completed, since a developer could always sell
48 lots and then convey the balance in a bulk sale.99
C. Subdivisions Containing 50 or More Lots
The third prima facie element of jurisdiction is the requirement that the
subdivision consist of 50 or more lots. 100 The threshold issue for this ele-
ment relates to the "universe" or "set" from which OILSR may count lots
in order to establish the jurisdictional minimum. The concept of common
promotion defines the outer boundaries of the pool of countable lots. Argu-
ably, exempted lots should not be counted for jurisdictional purposes. OILSR
has rejected this approach, however, and counts all lots within the common
promotion, notwithstanding that individual lots may be exempt from the
registration or antifraud provisions of the Act.' 0 '
The other issue of this jurisdictional element relates to the time frame for
counting lots. Since the Act became effective on April 27, 1969, lots sold
prior to this date are excluded from the count; 10 2 however, commonly pro-
moted lots developed but not sold prior to the effective date, and all com-
monly promoted lots developed subsequent to the date are subject to the
count.
III. EXEMPTIONS
If jurisdiction is asserted over a subdivision, the developer has the option
99. This same result could arguably be achieved by replatting lots into larger
parcels for purposes of sale, but such replatting has been held to be a means of promo-
tion adopted for purposes of evasion of the Act pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 1710.12 (1976).
See San Luis Ranches, E-298-1 1, OILSR No. 1-0262-05-9 (the exemption advisory opin-
ion was drafted but never issued due to developer's withdrawal of request).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (1970).
101. See, e.g., Antelope Hills Second Subdivision, supra note 58. See also letter from
John McDowell to H.D. Perrett (Jan. 2, 1975), Westwood, OILSR No. 4-1314-43-147,
which stated that "OILSR Regulation 1710.10(d) does exempt lots sold pursuant to a
court order from any disclosure filing. However, the regulation does not exempt the lots
from being counted in order to determine the size of the subdivision for purposes of
jurisdiction." Id.
One unfortunate effect of this policy is that a costly statement of record may be
required in order to promote a handful of lots in a subdivision comprised largely of
exempt lots. The only alternatives are abandonment or selling in violation of the Act.
102. See, e.g., Potomac Farms Subdivision, E-41-69 (Aug. 14, 1969), OILSR No.
1-0074-54-222, reprinted in 1 LAND DEv. L. REP. at B-2 (subdivision of 161 lots, of
which 121 were sold prior to April 28, 1969, held to constitute a common promotion
of 40 lots subject to the Act.)
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to seek an exemption. 103 Two classes of exemptions are available: self-
operating and conditional. The former arises automatically whenever
the facts warrant,' 0 4 but to obtain an exemption in the latter category
the developer must submit a report and obtain an agency statement that
the exemption applies. 105 Sales made prior to such a statement will be
considered violations, notwithstanding the fact that the statement might ulti-
mately issue. 10  OILSR has construed both classes of exemptions very
strictly.
A. Self-Operating Exemptions
Lots Not Promoted Pursuant To A Common Promotional Plan. The
first exemption in section 1710.10,10 relating to lots not promoted "pursuant
to common promotional plan to offer 50 or more lots in a subdivision,"'108
is not an exemption at all but rather an element of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
denotes possession of power to regulate,' 09 whereas exemption denotes
103. Compliance with OILSR filing requirements is costly. Costs include a maximum
$1,000 filing fee, attorney and accountant retainers to prepare the disclosure filing, the
staggering costs of a certified audit, and the cost of time delays. The most expedient
means of avoiding these costs is to simply avoid OILSR jurisdiction. Where the subdivi-
sion contains fewer than 300 lots, a second alternative is to carefully conform promotion
of the subdivision to the requirements of the Limited Offering Exemption, discussed
infra at pp. 374-77. That exemption avoids the cost of a certified audit.
104. 24 C.F.R. §§ 1710.10, 1710.13 (1976).
105. 24 C.F.R. §§ 1710.14-.17 (1976). However, statements of record automatically
become effective 30 days after their filing unless the agency affirmatively declares an
earlier date or the effective date had been suspended. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.21 (1976).
106. See, e.g., Lake Laguna Palma, OILSR No. 3-0424-29-12.
107. In addition to the exemptions discussed in the text, there are several automatic
exemptions listed in section 1710.10 which have generated little or no activity. Para-
graph (e) exempts "the sale of evidences of indebtedness secured by a mortgage or deed
or trust." Additionally, the "sale of securities issued by a real estate investment trust"
is exempted by section 1710.10(f). However, an offering is not exempt under this
provision merely because it is labeled a security. Tropical River Groves, E-211-71 (May
19, 1969), OILSR No. 1-0001-09-1, reprinted in 1 LAND DEV. L. REP. at B-175. Like-
wise, offerings subject to federal securities regulation are not exempt. Id. The Act is
further rendered inapplicable to lot sales by "governments or government agencies."
However, this exemption does not extend to organizations that are merely regulated or
chartered by a government such as banks or savings and loan associations. 40 Fed.
Reg. 47,167(1975). However, the Philadelphia Authority for Industrial Redevelop-
ment, which possessed condemnation powers, was construed to be a bona fide govern-
ment agency. Various Philadelphia Industrial Parks, E-275-73 (Nov. 6, 1973), OILSR
No. 1-0436-44-16, reprinted in I LAND DEV. L. REP. at B-208. Paragraph (h) exempts
"the sale or lease of cemetery lots." Finally, section 1710.10(j) provides a complex
exemption for commercially or industrially zoned realty. For a detailed analysis of this
exemption, see 40 Fed. Reg. 47,168 (1975).
108. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.10(a) (1976).
109. See Campbell v. City of Plymouth, 293 Mich. 84, 85, 291 N.W. 231, 232 (1940).
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voluntary withholding of lawfully possessed power. 110 Since offerings of less
than 50 lots do not fall within the statute, OILSR does not possess any power
that it can voluntarily withhold. Although the distinction is academic in
cases involving only one subdivision, it becomes important where several
subdivisions are arguably linked by a common promotional plan. Whether
"common promotion" is applied liberally or strictly can depend, respectively
upon whether it is an exemption or an element of jurisdiction.
Subdivisions Comprised of 5-Acre Lots. Section 1710.10(b) exempts
the "sale or lease of lots in a subdivision, all of which are 5 acres or more
in size." Each term in this provision is strictly interpreted. If even one
lot within the subdivision is less than five acres, none of the lots qualify."'
When a subdivision of 5-acre lots is adjacent to undeveloped commonly
owned land, OILSR will demand assurance that any future lots will exceed
five acres. 1 1 2 Contiguous platted lots, each containing 21Y2 acres, may not be
combined into units of two and promoted under this exemption."l 8 When
small lots in a subdivision were initially promoted but later only lots exceed-
ing five acres were promoted, exemption has been similarly denied." 1 4  A
promotion following the replatting of a subdivision in order to create lots con-
taining five acres also has been held in conflict with the regulation." 15
The Builders' Exemptions. Paragraph (c) of section 1710.10 establishes
one of two builders' exemptions. The paragraph exempts the "sale or lease
of any lots on which there is a residential, commercial, or industrial
building, or .. . the sale or lease of land under a contract obligating the
seller to erect such a building thereon within a period of 2 years." Section
1710.10(i) sets forth the second builders' exemption, which exempts the
"sale or lease of lots to any person who acquires such lots for the purpose
of engaging in the business of constructing residential, commercial or indus-
trial buildings or for the purpose of resale or lease of such lots to persons
110. See BLACK'S LAW DiCTiONARY 681-82 (4th ed. 1968).
111. San Luis Estates South, E-299-74 (Jul. 30, 1974), OILSR No. 1-0451-05-20, and
Wintergreen, E-294-74 (May 28, 1974), OILSR No. 1-0452-58-3 (a subdivision com-
prised only of lots five acres or more, but promoted in common with other lots less
than five acres in size, not exempt). Cf. Avra Valley Estates Nos. 1 and 3, supra
note 58 (lots containing five acres or more, not commonly promoted with other prop-
erties owned by developer, held exempt).
112. See, e.g., Dave Valley, E-274-71 (Dec. 13, 1971), OILSR No. 1-390-02-82; Wil-
liamson Valley Property, E-228-1 (Aug. 25, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0333-02-67.
113. See Lake Meade Rancheros, supra note 79.
114. See Tropical River Groves, supra note 107.
115. See San Luis Ranches, supra note 99. This particular form of promotion was
found by OILSR to have been adopted by the developer for purposes of evasion of the
Act. See generally Coffey & Welch, supra note 2, at 38-39.
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engaged in such business." Since the exemptions relate to the sale of indi-
vidual lots, single lots in a subdivision may be promoted pursuant to this
exemption regardless of whether other lots in the subdivision are exempt. 116
Several concepts mentioned in the exemptions require interpretation. The
first is the term "building." OILSR construed "building" as a physically hab-
itable structure containing the full range of all utilities necessary to support
normal occupancy." 7 If the "primary inducement" for the sale of the
building is determined to be its common recreational facilities, OILSR fur-
ther requires the completion of such facilities.'
18
This definition appears to be outside OILSR's authority. All statutes
should be given their ordinary meaning unless a technical meaning is clearly
indicated. 1' 9 The common notion of a "building" is a structure or edifice,1
2 0
not necessarily including utility services and recreational facilities. Addition-
ally, the provision of utility services and recreational facilities necessarily re-
quires off-lot construction. 12 ' The terms of section 1710.10(c) of the Act
clearly do not condition the exemption upon conditions existing outside of
the lot.
When applied to condominiums, the definition of building raises the addi-
tional issue of whether "building" refers to the individual condominium unit
or to the complete apartment house. The former view is the better alterna-
tive, for the latter view would require "buildings" to be erected on every
"lot" in the "subdivision" as a condition for exemption.
Additional issues regarding the term "building" are raised by mobile home
developments. In Redwood Estates, 22 a package promotion of lots and
mobile homes was held exempt where the purchaser was contractually obli-
gated to buy a mobile home from the developer and to have the developer
place the home on the lot. When a purchaser covenants that he will obtain a
116. See Tahoe Donner Golf Club Condominium, E-313-74 (Nov. 29, 1974), OILSR
No. 1-0462-04-62, reprinted in 1 LAND DEV. L. REP. at B-236.
117. Letter from Alfred Lehtonen, supra note 72; accord, 39 Fed. Reg. 7,824 (1974).
118. 39 Fed. Reg. 7,825 (1974). For purposes of this determination, the primary in-
ducement for sales of urban residential condominiums is assumed to be the residential
nature of the complex. The fact that luxurious common facilities form a strong selling
point is not considered. Interview with William Heyman, Programs Analyst, OILSR, in
Washington, D.C. (Aug. 29, 1975).
119. A. SUTHERLAND, supra note 28, § 47.28. OILSR has expressly adopted this
canon. Letter from Alfred Lehtonen, supra note 72.
120. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 244 (4th ed. 1968) and cases cited therein.
121. For example, trunk and feeder utility lines necessitate off-lot construction. This
issue becomes especially critical in cases where sewer hook-up moratoria are in effect.
122. E-208-71 (Jun. 14, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0332-49-29, reprinted in 1 LAND DEV.
L. REP. at B-95.
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mobile home within two years for a developer to install upon a trailer lot,
however, the sale is not exempt. 12a
A second phrase requiring OILSR interpretation is the 2-year contractual
provision in section 1710.10(c). The 2-year period begins when the pur-
chaser executes the contract; 124 execution of a nonbinding option does not
suffice.1 25  The only exception to the strict 2-year limit is the contractual
defense of impossibility.' 26  OILSR construes "contract" to require "an
independent covenant [requiring] the seller of the unimproved lot to erect
a building thereon within two years of the date of the contract for the sale of
the lot."' 27  This covenant must unequivocably obligate the developer to
complete the building within two years of the date of contract. 1 2  OILSR
does not appear to have granted any exceptions to the binding nature of the
required obligation. 129
123. See Siesta Mobile Estates Unit Three, E-315-74 (Jan. 3, 1975), OILSR No. 1-
0478-02-89.
124. 39 Fed. Reg. 7,825 (1974).
125. Id. However, any funds must be deposited in an escrow account and must be
refundable upon purchaser's request. Additional affirmative action by the purchaser
must be required in order to create a binding obligation. Id.
126. 40 Fed. Reg. 47,167 (1975). Such impossibility may delay performance but
may not extinguish contractual liability. Skyline Plaza South Condominium Project,
E-322-75 (Feb. 13, 1975), OILSR No. 1-0474-54-18, reprinted in 1 LAND DEV. L. REP.
at B-247 (stipulation that Acts of God may extend but not cancel the contract held
exempt). Any such delay must be beyond the control of the developer. 39 Fed. Reg.
7,825 (1974).
127. Letter from Alfred Lehtonen, supra note 72.
128. See Black Oak Cove, E-267-73 (May 3, 1973), OILSR No. 1-0428-29-18, re-
printed in 1 LAND DEv. L. REP. at B-20. The following language has been held suffi-
cient:
It is expressly warranted that in the event a sale of property yet to be con-
structed is made hereunder, said property and all other property contained in
the same structure as said property shall be completed and a final closing con-
summated hereunder not more than two (2) years from the date hereof.
Port Holiday, E-190-71 (Apr. 21, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0316-29-16, reprinted in 1 LAND
DEV. L. REP. at B-91 to 92.
129. Examples of impermissible contract clauses include: an obligation to build a
structure "only if the request is made by the buyer within two years after the date of
the sale contract," St. Andrews on the Gulf, E-33-69 (Jul. 29, 1969), OILSR No. 1-
0070-28-1, reprinted in 1 LAND DEV. L. REP. at B-79; covenants permitting the developer
to rescind unilaterally, Stonebridge Condominiums, Tamarack Townhouses, & Laurel-
wood Condominiums, E-57-69 (Oct. 28, 1969), OILSR No. 1-0063-05-5; covenants per-
mitting the purchaser to rescind unilaterally, Black Oak Cove, supra note 134; covenants
permitting rescission upon a condition subsequent, Citrus Woods Estates, E-326-75
(Mar. 26, 1975), OILSR No. 1-0482-09-25, reprinted in I LAND DEV. L. REP. at B-
250; and covenants precluding buyer's suit for specific performance, Zion Summit Con-
dominium, E-320-75 (Jan. 28, 1975), OILSR No. 1-0487-52-4, reprinted in 1 LAND DEV.




Similar to the two builders' exemptions is section 1710.13(c), 110 which
exempts incidental sales in subdivisions that otherwise comply with section
1710.10(c)(i). There are three technical requirements: the total num-
ber of sales in the subdivision not exempt under sections 1710.10(c)
(i) may not exceed 50 or five percent of the developer's total lots platted
of record, all other sales in the subdivision must be exempt pursuant
to the two builders' exemptions, and the lots must be platted. The five
percent requirement mandates continuous monitoring of sales programs.
If any conditions are breached, all sales not otherwise exempt will be deemed
retroactive violations.131
Sale or Lease of Real Estate Pursuant to Court Order. The fourth auto-
matic exemption, concerning "the sale or lease of real estate pursuant to
court order,"'132 has encompassed a variety of judicial orders for exemption,
including condemnation proceedings,13 3 bankruptcy proceedings, 134 fore-
closures and lien enforcements, 135 and sheriff's auctions.136. OILSR has
interpreted the term "pursuant," however, with great specificity. Thus, a
direct order from a court to a trustee in bankruptcy to sell certain lots1 37 or
an order to sell a group of lots according to specified terms13 8 is held exempt,
but sales pursuant to a court order vesting general business discretion in the
130. For official commentary on the nature of this exemption, see 39 Fed. Reg.
9,431-32 (1974).
131. See, e.g., Letter from John McDowell to Donald J. Hearn (Aug. 16, 1974), The
Great Hills, OILSR No. 4-0405-49-89.
132. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.10(d) (1976).
133. See Letter from John McDowell to H.D. Perrett (Jan. 2, 1975), Westwood
Phase I, OILSR No. 4-1314-43-147.
134. See Letter from John McDowell to Honorable Paul W. LaPrade (Jun. 5, 1975),
regarding State v. Combined Equity Assurance Co., No. C299,570 (Ariz. Super. Ct.,
filed Sept. 19, 1974). OILSR's general policy toward orders given in bankruptcy ad-
ministration has been well received by the federal judiciary. For example, in his "Order
Respecting Exemption from Requirements of the Interstate Land Sales Act," July 24,
1975, In re Gulfco Investment Corp., No. Bk 74-484 (W.-D. Okla. filed Mar. 22, 1974),
Judge Bohanon, after communication with HUD, directed the trustee to comply with
the Act. But see Letter from William Ingersoll, Esquire, Office of the General Coun-
sel, OILSR, to Samuel Rothman, Esquire (Sep. 5, 1975), Terre Du Lac, OILSR No.
0-1475-29-56 (A-E), in which a bankruptcy judge held that sales by a trustee under
general grant of authority were exempt, provided purchasers were offered the oppor-
tunity to rescind after an effective filing was finally made with OILSR.
135. Interview with Richard Heinderman, Esquire, Special Assistant, OILSR, in
Washington, D.C. (Sep. 5, 1975); Letter to Honorable Paul W. LaPrade, supra note 134.
136. See Snowflake Highlands Unit I, II, III, E-127-70 (Aug. 12, 1970), OILSR
No. 1-02211-02-22, reprinted in 1 LAND DEv. L. REP. at B-99.
137. Letter to Honorable Paul W. LaPrade, supra note 134, citing In re Gulfco In-
vestment Corp., No. Bk 74-484 (W.-D. Okla. filed Mar. 22, 1974) and In re Marble
Ski Area, Inc., No. 74-b 2719 (D. Colo. filed Sept. 10, 1974).
138. See Snowflake Highlands Unit I, II, III, supra note 136.
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trustee are not exempt.139  Out-of-court litigation settlements deviate from
this general rule. A court-supervised settlement, under which the developer
exchanges the purchased lots for others, inherently involves both specific
lots and terms. However, OILSR considers such transfers nonexempt. 140
Regulatory Exemptions. Two additional self-operating exemptions are
established in section 1710.13. Paragraph (a) exempts "sales or lease of
lots, each of which will be sold for less than $100, including closing costs,
provided that the purchaser will not be required to purchase more than one
lot." Paragraph (b) exempts the "lease of lots for a term not to exceed
five years provided the terms of the lease do not obligate the lessee to renew."
B. Conditional Exemptions
Claim of Exemption. To qualify for a conditional exemption under sec-
tion 1710.11(a), a developer must prove that at the time of sale the subdivi-
sion was free and clear of all liens or encumbrances, and must observe cer-
tain procedural requirements with respect to the purchaser and OILSR.14 1
In addition, the developer must file a claim of exemption in a form prescribed
by regulation.' 42  Each of the conditions for qualifying for a conditional
exemption has received considerable administrative attention.
Two concepts in the requirement that "at the time of sale or lease, the
real estate is free and clear of all liens, encumbrances, and adverse claims"
require elaboration. Section 1710.11(c) (2) defines the liens, encumber-
ances, and adverse claim to exclude:
(i) Property reservations which land developers commonly con-
vey or dedicate to local bodies or public utilities for the purpose of
bringing public services to the land being developed.
(ii) Taxes and assessments imposed by a State, by any other public
body having authority to assess and tax property or by a property
owners' association which under applicable State or local law con-
stitute liens before they are due and payable.
(iii) Beneficial property restrictions which would be enforceable
by other lot owners or lessees in the subdivision.
139. See Letter from John McDowell to Honorable Patricia Ann Clark (Jun. 11,
1975), The Woodmoor Corp., OILSR No. 0-0965-05-50. This situation is viewed not
as being directly court-ordered, but rather as the receiver "stepping into the shoes of the
developer." Letter to Honorable Paul W. LaPrade, supra note 134.
140. See Letter from John McDowell to Honorable James Walsh (Jul. 9, 1975) (a
letter to the court regarding O'Neil v. Horizon Corp., Civil No. 75-133 Tuc. (D. Ariz.
filed May 23, 1975)).
141. 24C.F.R. § 1710.11(a) (1976).




Any reservation or encumbrance not falling within the literal terms of these
requirements will render the subdivision nonexempt. For example, pursuant
to section 1408.11(c)(2)(i), "the right of way of record . . disqualifies
the subdivision for the exemption unless it is for the express purpose of bring-
ing public service to the land being developed.' 1 43  Examples of disqualify-
ing rights-of-way include easements for power lines which do not service the
subdivision, 144 railroad rights-of-way, 45 land patents containing reservations
to the United States, 146 mineral rights containing reservations which include
rights of ingress or egress, 141 and reservations or easements in favor of the
developer to perform maintenance services.' 48  To qualify under subpara-
graph(ii), all taxes or assessments to which the land is subject must be
imposed by a public entity possessing taxing authority or by a bona fide
property owners' association.' 49  Thus, assessment owing directly to a
developer'50 or to a property owners' association controlled by the developer
render the subdivision nonexempt.' 5 ' Finally, pursuant to subparagraph
(iii), any derogation whatsoever of the rights of the lot owners, jointly or
severally, to enforce a restriction will disqualify the subdivision for exemption.
143. See Letter from John McDowell to Mark A. Kaplan, Esquire (Jun. 2, 1975),
Lake Champlain Estates, OILSR No. 2-0973-53-4.
144. See Letter from John McDowell to Ben H. Wilkenson, Esquire (May 19, 1975),
Lake Tellavana, OILSR No. 2-0944-09-55; Letter to Norman Smith, Esquire (May 27,
1975), Deer Run, OILSR No. 2-0824-10-30.
145. See Letter from John McDowell to Thomas B. Cantwell, Esquire (May 13,
1975), Rainbow Lakes Estates, OILSR No. 2-0868-37-11.
146. See Letter from John McDowell to Gerald R. Kolb, Esquire (May 19, 1975),
Antelope Meadows, OILSR No. 2-0933-43-914 (patent contained reservations to the
United States permitting construction of ditches and canals). The Deputy Administrator
of OILSR noted that most land west of the Mississippi River was conveyed by land
patent and that if such patent contained a reservation to the federal government for
construction of canals and ditches, the real estate would not qualify for exemption. Id.
147. See Letter from John McDowell to Mr. R. Ray Pope (May 19, 1975), Orenda
Vista Estates, OILSR No. 2-0905-38-74.
148. See Letter from John McDowell to Paul Perona, Jr., Esquire (May 19, 1975),
Hopewell Estates, OILSR No. 2-0902-13-5 (easement to drain surface water); Letter to
J. John Anderholt, Esquire (Jun. 2, 1975), Del Safari Country Club Tract 4018, OILSR
No. 2-0860-04-25 (reservation to developer to enter a lot to clear the land and to trim
trees).
149. Letter from John McDowell to Jack D. Stokes, Esquire (May 20, 1975), Pon-
derosa Park Unit II, OILSR No. 2-0957-09-63.
150. This policy is rather strictly enforced. For example, even assessments resulting
from the developer's supply of water to the subdivision have disqualified a subdivision
from exemption. See Letter to Mark Kaplan, supra note 143.
151. OILSR deems such an association to be the "alter ego" of the developer, and
therefore payment to the association is equivalent to payment to the developer. Inter-
view with William Heyman, Programs Analyst, OIISR, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 29,
1975).
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Thus, the reservation of rights to the developer instead of the lot owners,152
or the vesting of discretionary enforcement powers in the developer 153 or
in a developer-controlled owners' association1 54 results in nonexemption.
Exemption also will be denied if the developer retains the power to change
restrictions on unsold lots,"" or if the power to enforce the covenants is re-
tained by the developer beyond a "reasonable" time.15 6
The second phrase in section 1710.11(a) which has a special definition
is "time of sale." Section 1710.11(c)(1) defines "time of sale or lease" to
be "the date the sales contract or lease is signed by the purchaser." The
"effective date" of the conveyance may become the "time of sale" for deter-
mination of encumbrance purposes when two conditions are met: the con-
tract of sale must require delivery of a deed to the purchaser within 120
days following the signing of the sales contract, and any payment made prior
to the effective date of the conveyance must be placed in an escrow account
fully protecting the interest of the purchaser.1 57 This exception, when ap-
plicable, may delay the "time of sale" up to 120 days after the contract
execution. Thus, a subdivision may be encumbered with a blanket mortgage
at the time of contract execution but still become eligible for exemption under
section 1710.11 (c).15 8
Resales are not covered by the original claim of exemption because the
original purchaser might subject the lot to a lien or mortgage during his term
152. See Letter from John McDowell to Gregory Meurer, Esquire (May 16, 1975),
Wimble Shores and Wimble Shores North, OILSR No. 2-0940-38-79 (reservation by the
developer of the right to disapprove individual lot sewage treatment plans found to dis-
qualify the subdivision from exemption).
153. Letter from John McDowell to Thomas S. Recicar (Jun. 13, 1975), Bithlo
Replat and 'Seminole Terrace, OILSR No. 2-0955-09-61 ("Reservations and restrictions
which require the approval of or the exercise of discretion by the developer are unac-
ceptable for purposes of this exemption since they would not be enforceable by the other
lot owners."); Letter from John McDowell to Jerome Bauman (Jun. 2, 1975), Tusca-
willa (Winter Springs Unit 4), OILSR No. 2-0943-09-58 (discretionary power to release
lots from restrictions if violations are "minor," held not to qualify for exemption).
154. Letter to J. John Anderholt, supra note 148.
155. Letter to C. W. Coates (Jun. 13, 1975), Wood and Brooks Company Plat of
Pigeon Cove, OILSR No. 2-0893-26-10.
156. OILSR views "reasonable" as three years, or when 30 percent of the lots are
sold, whichever occurs first. See Memorandum from Roger Henderson, Policy Develop-
ment and Control Division, OILSR to John McDowell, Deputy Administrator, OILSR
(Aug. 12, 1975) (on file at OILSR).
157. 24C.F.R. § 1710.11(c)(1) (1976).
158. This escrow procedure should not be confused with a bona fide installment con-
tract. No escrow provisions are required if no encumbrance is placed on the lot pending
transfer of legal title. Interview with R. David Pankratz, Chief of Policy and Exemp-
tions, OILSR, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 14, 1975).
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of possession. 15 9 Therefore, unless a repossessed lot qualifies under one of
the self-operating exemptions, the developer must submit a new claim of ex-
emption.
In addition to a showing of freedom from encumbrance, the developer
must also observe certain procedural requirements. Section 1710.11 (a) sets
out three requirements for each purchaser: the purchaser or purchaser's
spouse must make a personal on-site inspection of the lot prior to the execu-
tion of the sales contract, the purchaser must receive a "Statement of Reserva-
tion Restrictions, Taxes, and Assessments" prior to the contractual execu-
tion, and the purchaser must execute an acknowledgment confirming receipt
of that statement prior to the signing of the contract. 1 0
The developer is further obligated by section 1710.11 to observe certain
procedures vis-a-vis OILSR. Section 1710.11(a) (4) requires the developer
to obtain OILSR's approval of the Statement of Reservation, Restrictions,
Taxes, and Assessments prior to any sale, and section 1710.11(b) requires
the developer to file with OILSR a copy of the developer's affirmation and a
copy of the purchaser's acknowledgment for each sale no later than January
31 of the calendar year following the calendar year in which the sale was
made. If the developer utilized the procedure detailed in paragraph (c)
(i),161 he is also obligated to file a copy of the sales contract.
In 1974, OILSR began systematically to enforce the annual filing re-
quirement. Claims of exemption for which annual filings were not timely
received were terminated effective upon receipt of the termination notice.' 6 2
159. 40 Fed. Reg. 47,169 (1975).
160. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.11(a) (1976). The requirement of acknowledgment prior
to contract clearly indicates that the purchaser's signature on the statement must be
obtained prior to the execution of the contract.
161. This procedure is set out at p. 3 72 supra.
162. This enforcement policy highlighted a technical omission in the claim of ex-
emption procedure, namely, that a developer was not obligated to make any annual
filing unless sales were made. Consequently, OILSR ultimately terminated many exemp-
tions in which the absence of the annual filing was caused by a lack of sales. See, e.g.,
Letter from John McDowell to Gordon Yates (Dec. 16, 1975), Yates Addition West,
OILSR No. 2-0239-49-20; Yates Addition, OILSR No. 2-0236-49-19-A.
Pursuant to Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), a fair hearing to establish
probable cause must be afforded prior to government termination of an existing benefit
where the "recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest
in summary adjudication." Id. at 262-63. It is arguable that an OILSR exemption is
such a benefit, although OILSR officially disagrees. Interview with John McDowell,
supra note 57. Despite statements to the contrary, e.g., Letter from John McDowell to
Terrence Roche Murphy, Esquire (Nov. 4, 1974), Brigands' Bays, OILSR No. 2-0489-
38-37, OILSR will afford an informal hearing to any terminated developer in its
main offices, but will not withhold a termination action pending a factual hearing.
Interview with John McDowell, supra note 57. However, neither the hearing and notice
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Affirmations and acknowledgments were then requested for all sales for which
annual filings were not made. If the developer ultimately furnished proper
affirmations and acknowledgments to OILSR, further enforcement action was
waived, since the ultimate production of the documents evidenced that the
purchaser was afforded his full entitlement of disclosure. 16  The total
failure to produce the proper documents, however, may justify imple-
mentation of consumer remedies.16 4 Following termination of the claim of
exemption, the subdivision possesses the status of an unregistered subdivision.
A termination does not, however, disqualify the subdivision for a new claim
of exemption.'05
The Limited Ojering Exemption. The Limited Offering Exemption
established in section 1710.14 exempts two distinct types of promotions:
those in which the lots will be sold in a single bulk transaction and those in
which the promotion is entirely, or almost entirely, intrastate.
The first exemption provides no major interpretational difficulty. On its
face, the exemption contains no limitation on the residence of the buyer, no
restrictions on the types of advertising, and no maximum limit on the number
of lots. 166 Most of the controversy has involved the intrastate promotion ex-
emption, which sets forth five specific requirements:
(i) There are less than 300 lots in the subdivision.
(ii) The subdivision is located entirely within one State.
(iii) The offering of lots in the subdivision is entirely or almost
entirely limited to the State in which the subdivision is located.
(iv) The use of all advertising and other promotional means,
the distribution of which is within control of the developer or his
agents, is confined to the State in which the subdivision is located.
All use of billboards and similar signs, telephonic methods of com-
munication and direct mail shall be presumed to be within the con-
trol of the developer or his agents.
(v) No more than five percent of the sales in the subdivision in
any one year will be made to nonresidents of the State in which the
subdivision is located.
requirement nor OILSR regulations require OILSR to remind the developer to submit
his annual filing.
163. Letter from John McDowell to Joe Collins, Esquire (Dec. 10, 1974), Edge Sub-
division Third Addition, OILSR No. 2-0320-29-26(A).
164. Interview with John McDowell, supra note 57.
165. See, e.g., Brigands Bay, OILSR No. 2-0489-38-37 (terminated); Brigand's Bay,
OILSR No. 2-0804-38-71 (new claim of exemption).
166. The jurisdictional issue of the definition of "lot" also can be raised in this
connection. See pp. 363-64 supra.
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Admittedly, 300 is an arbitrary figure, since there is no inherent difference
between 290-lot subdivisions and 310-lot subdivisions. However, HUD has
the authority to exempt offerings solely on the basis of the limited number
of lots contained therein; 6 7 hence, this figure does not appear to be an abuse
of discretion.
The third requirement, that the offering be "entirely or almost entirely"
within the situs state, prohibits substantial promotional activity that crosses
any state border. Promotions using a television station with a multistate
broadcast range, 168 magazines with 80 percent out-of-state circulation, 6 9
a radio station that broadcasts to a "substantial portion" of a major popula-
tion area of another state,17 0 and newspapers with substantial out-of-state
circulation1 7 ' have all been held to be interstate promotions. However,
insignificant interstate promotion by the same media has been found
not to preclude the exemption.' 72  Interstate advertisements expressly stat-
167. 37 Fed. Reg. 1,305 (1972).
168. See Beautiful Broadkill Beach, E-246-71 (Dec. 9, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0374-
07-1, reprinted in I LAND Dav. L. REP. at B-106.
169. Cf. Gavilan Park, E-93-70 (Jan. 28, 1970), OILSR No. 1-0039-04-7 (involving
the magazine Trailer Life). This opinion was rendered under the now defunct section
1710.10(1), which exempted offerings that were, without further elaboration, "entirely
or almost entirely intrastate" in nature. This precedent is still relevant, however, since
the old section 1710.10(1) appears to be the functional equivalent of the present section
1710.14(a) (2) (iii).
170 See Laurel Estates, E-240-71 (Oct. 28, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0364-20-5.
171. See Rudd Pond Farms, Inc., E-240-71 (Oct. 29, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0351-
37-4, reprinted in 1 LAND DEV. L. REP. at B-44 (New York Times). Contra, King's
Valley Custom Resort Development, E-249-71 (Dec. 17, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0369-
05-14 (Denver Post).
172. See, e.g., Fort Clark Springs, E-237-71 (Oct. 8, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0376-49-32
(nominal out-of-state newspaper circulation); Sundowner Lake & Ranch Resort, E-197-
71 (May 5, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0328-49-28 ("incidental" out-of-state radio and tele-
vision).
The numerous agency decisions relating to newspaper promotion help define what
OILSR considers "insignificant." When a large percentage of the circulation is out-of-
state, the promotion will normally be nonexempt. See, e.g., Rudd Park Farms, Inc.,
supra note 171 (New York Times); Tall Timbers Development, E-212-71 (Jul. 8, 1971),
OILSR No. 1-0315-49-16 (one-sixth of circulation out-of-state); Kingston Canyon Stream-
sites, E-203-71 (Jun. 25, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0331-33-2 (500-600 of 1,050 copies of
daily circulation out-of-state); Cypress Bayou, E-182-71 (Apr. 6, 1971), OILSR No.
1-0309-09-15 (Tampa Tribune, 1,785 Sunday and 1,353 daily out-of-state circulation).
Contra, King's Valley Custom Resort Development, supra note 171 (advertising in the
Denver Post held exempt). However, a low out-of-state circulation, even though consti-
tuting a high percentage of overall circulation, may be exempt. See, e.g., El Encanto Es-
tates, E-195-71 (Apr. 30, 1975), OILSR No. 1-0314-02-60 (4,000 total circulation of
which 90 were out-of-state); Fort Clark Springs, supra; Sundowner Lake & Ranch Re-
sort, supra; Memorandum from Leslie J. Carson, Associate General Counsel, to Alfred
Lehtonen, Administrator, OILSR (May 4, 1970), Piedmont Enterprises, Inc., Middle
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ing that only in-state responses will be honored appear exempt. 178  OILSR
has been inconsistent on whether purely intrastate uses of advertising media
substantially affecting interstate commerce are exempt. 174  They have been
equally inconsistent in deciding whether one violation permanently dis-
qualifies the subdivision.1 75 Use of out-of-state salesmen seems clearly to
render the subdivision nonexempt. 176
Supplementing subsection (iii) are the stricter requirements of subsection
(iv). This provision strictly confines the use of all promotional means
"within the control of the developer" to the situs state. "Billboards and
similar signs, telephonic methods of communication and direct mail" are
presumed to be "within the control of the developer." This presumption is
considered irrebuttable, 77 and the intrastate limitation is literally enforced.17 8
River Retreat, OILSR No. 1-0209-54-8 (300 out-of-state circulation of 2,500 total is
"so small that it need not be considered as disqualifying").
173. See Woodrun, E-207-71 (Jun. 14, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0317-38-4.
174. For example, OILSR currently considers advertising on billboards not to affect
exemption under section 1710.14 if the billboards are located within the same state as
the promoted subdivision. Interview with Cora Spiva, Realty Specialist, OILSR, in
Washington, D.C. (Sep. 8, 1975). Previous decisions have split. Compare Oceana
Marin, E-234-71 (Oct. 10, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0367-04-51 (billboard located on U.S.
Highway 101 in California held to constitute intrastate promotion), with Memorandum
from John W. Kopecky, Acting Associate General Counsel, OILSR (Sep. 9, 1969), re-
printed in 1 LAND DEV. L. REP. at B-126 and Letter from John McDowell to Gilvert
Rooth (Jul. 23, 1975), Leisure Hills, OILSR No. 4-2771-09-337.
175. OILSR currently holds that one violation permanently disqualifies the subdivi-
sion. Interview with Cora Spiva, supra note 174. Numerous precedents exist to the
contrary, however. See, e.g., King's Valley Custom Resort Development, supra note
171 (deliberately ignoring promotion through the Denver Post due to the "overall" com-
pliance with regulations); Potomac Valley Farms, E-219-71 (Aug. 3, 1971), OILSR
No. 1-0349-24-2 (exemption order issued in late 1971, although developer advertised in
Washington Post until 1970). OILSR decisions are also split on whether interstate ad-
vertising "presumptively" disqualifies the subdivision. Compare Rudd Pond Farms, Inc.
supra note 171 (promotion in New York Times "presumptively disqualifies") and Juni-
per Hills, E-187-71 (Apr. 16, 1971), OILSR No. 1-0203-43-47 (lots offered neither en-
tirely nor almost entirely intrastate), with King's Valley Custom Resort Development,
supra note 171 (OILSR looks to dominant intent, as manifested by overall promotion).
176. See Tract 29291, D & R Associates, Ltd., E-148-71 (Jan. 29, 1971), OILSR
No. 1-0266-04-48, reprinted in 1 LAND DEv. L. REP. at B-135 (subdivision not exempt
when "[tihere seems to be the implication that the subject lots could also be purchased
[from] these (out of state) representatives.").
177. Interview with R. David Pankratz, supra note 158.
178. See, e.g., Letter from John McDowell to Lawrence J. Metz (May 28, 1975),
Emerald Acres, OILSR No.3-1049-26-45 (one percent direct mailing out-of-state held
non-exempt). Note that this standard for developer-controlled advertising is substan-
tially stricter than the "entirely or almost entirely" intrastate standard applicable to non-
developer-controlled means established in 24 C.F.R. § 1710.14(a) (2) (iii) (1976).
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Use of local real estate brokers who do not substantially advertise, however,
has been held to constitute only intrastate promotion.1 79
The final requirement is that no more than five percent of the sales "in any
one year" be made to nonresidents. OILSR has not been restricted by the
literal meaning of the phrase "in any one year." For example, on May 28,
1975, the office terminated an exemption order for Shire Mobile Homes
because four of 46 lots had been sold to out-of-state residents since Jan-
uary 1 of the same year.180 In view of the clear language calling for an
annual, as opposed to ad hoc, accounting, the decision in Shire Mobile
Homes appears to have been beyond OILSR's authority.
To obtain an Exemption Order pursuant to a conditional exemption under
regulation 1710.11, the developer must submit a filing in accordance with
section 1710.14(b). The Policy and Exemption Branch requires specificity
and full documentation of the required information. 1 8 ' Even though a sub-
division may strictly qualify, OILSR reserves the right to withhold exemp-
tion.' 8 2 An Exemption Order does not suspend the antifraud provisions of
the Act nor the Act's advertising guidelines.'8 3
C. Remedies
Remedial procedures vary with the violation. Any violation automatically
terminates the exemption order and permanently disqualifies the subdivision
from further exemption.' 8 4 Violation of the Act may also entail criminal
or civil liability, the former being the ultimate sanction against a noncomply-
ing developer.' 8 5
179. See Manzanita Hills & Doodlebug Ranch, E-179-71 (May 4, 1971), OILSR No.
1-0301-02-55.
180. See Letter from John McDowell to Clarence Engle (May 28, 1975), Shire
Mobile Homes, OILSR No. 3-1095-09-54.
181. Interview with R. David Pankratz, supra note 158. For example, when a
common promotional plan links two or more subdivisions and the developer fails to
provide information on any component part, the Exemption Order will be withheld. Id.
182. 40 Fed. Reg. 47,169 (1975).
183. See Letter from John McDowell to Charles Rawson (Jul. 29, 1975), Callender
Lake, OILSR No. 3-0283-49-72.
184. See note 175 supra. See also Letter from John McDowell to N. John Stewart,
Esquire (Jan. 15, 1975), Virginia City, OILSR No. 3-0821-09-41; 40 Fed. Reg. 47,170
(1975).
185. The Attorney General of the United States may, in his discretion, institute crim-
inal proceedings under the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (1970). For a general discussion
of this prosecutorial power, see Coffey & Welch, supra note 2, at 50. As of this writing,
13 criminal cases have been brought. See, e.g., United States v. Pocono Int'l Corp.,
No. 75-1229 (2d Cir. Nov. 26, 1975), afj'g 378 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (upheld
separate counts for mail fraud violations and Land Sales Act violations in a single in-
dictment); United States v. Del Rio Springs, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 226, 228 (D. Ariz. 1975)
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In addition to criminal sanctions, the Act authorizes three forms of civil
action. First, HUD is empowered to file suit to enjoin sales practices that
may violate the Act' 86 and enforce the injunctions by subpoena. 187  Sec-
ond, a private plaintiff may seek damages for any of three promotional
abuses: 18  Selling of lots when the statement of record contains a ma-
terial omission or untruth, use of a property report containing a material
falsity or omission, and selling of lots without furnishing a valid prop-
erty report. 189 Several alternative formulas may be used to compute dam-
ages,' 90 but recovery is strictly restitutionary and cannot exceed the plaintiff's
actual damages, including court costs.' 9 '
The third civil action authorized by the Act is for rescission of the sales
contract.'1 2 The purchaser may seek this remedy on any of three different
grounds. Section 1703(b) establishes an unqualified right for the purchaser
to void his purchase contract unless he receives a valid property report prior
to the execution of the contract. Recent amendments to this section have
provided a second distinct cause for rescission. When the developer provides
the property report less than 48 hours before execution of the contract, the
purchaser may rescind the contract within three business days after the
signing.'9 3 Finally, section 1709(a) authorizes the purchaser to sue "either
at law or in equity" if the statement of record covering the subject lot at the
time of sale contained a material falsity or omission.
(distinguishing the Mail Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970), from the Land Sales Act
as requiring different elements of proof, although not directly facing the issue of sep-
arate counts in the indictment).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (1970) vests discretionary authority with the Secretary to
instigate such actions, implying that private plaintiffs may not file a similar suit nor a
mandamus action.
187. At this writing there have been at least 13 cases of subpoena enforcement. Al-
though largely unreported, one case in which a formal opinion was issued is Lynn v.
Biderman, 536 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Biderman v. Hills, 97 S.
Ct. 316 (1976).
188. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1709(a)-(b) (1970). For a comparison of the Act's remedies with
federal securities remedies, see Coffey & Welch, supra note 2, at 54.
189. Actions under section 1709(b), relating to property reports, differ from actions
on statements of record under section 1709(a) in one fundamental respect. A suit
under section 1709(a) may be defended on the ground that the purchaser actually knew
of the falsity or omission in the statement. No such defense is accorded for actions under
section 1709(b). See also Coffey & Welch, supra note 2, at 60-61. Neither action
appears to require actual reliance by a purchaser. See id. at 60-62.
190. 15 U.S.C. § 1709(c) (1970). For a hypothetical application of these formulas,
see Coffey & Welch, supra note 2, at 68-70.
191. 15 U.S.C. § 1709(e) (1970). Although nonpunitive in nature, these damages
were intended to act as "enforcement machinery" for the antifraud provisions of the
Act. See Coffey & Welch, supra note 2, at 54.
192. 15 U.S.C. § 1703(b) (1970).
193. Id. (Supp. IV, 1974).
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The major questions concerning construction of the Act's civil remedies
have arisen in regard to proper parties, class action certification, pleading,
and the statute of limitations.
Proper Parties. The issue of plaintiff standing under the Act has been
litigated only once. In Adolphus v. Zebelman,194 the minority stockholders
of a developer corporation sought to enjoin further sales pending an effec-
tive registration. The trial court acknowledged the "serious question" of
whether plaintiffs were within the Act's zone of interest, but granted relief
without further opinion. 195  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit noted that
liabilities flowing from illegal sales could damage the corporation and
derivatively affect the value of plaintiffs' stock. The panel concluded that
the allegation was "barely sufficient" to constitute "injury in fact."'196
Class Action Certification. The issue of class action certification for suits
under the Act has received confusing treatment. In Hoffman v. Charnita,
Inc., ' 9 7 a federal district court certified a class action complaint alleging dam-
ages stemming from omissions in a property report. Although the developer
had filed several consolidations and amendments to his statement of record,
the critical omission occurred in all editions of the report. Thus, the issue of
liability was common to all plaintiffs. The court admitted that damages
would differ for each plaintiff but found this to cause no administrative
problem since each sum could be easily ascertained. A pendent com-
plaint of common law fraud was not certified, however, since each plaintiff
was obligated under that cause to prove individual reliance. 198  Because
Hoffman was premised upon the erroneous assertion that the "Act . . .
provides only for a civil suit to recover damages and does not sanction the
remedy of rescission,"' 9 9 however, its persuasive authority appears dissipated.
194. 486 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1973).
195. 354 F. Supp. at 310.
196. 486 F.2d at 1326. See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Associa-
tion of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). In
these cases, the Supreme Court appears to have established a two-pronged test for
standing. An "injury in fact" is required in order to satisfy the constitutional "case or
controversy" requirement and the plaintiff must also fall within the "zone of interests"
protected by the statute. In Adolphus, the court of appeals found that there had been
injury in fact. It ruled that it need not decide if the plaintiffs were within the "zone of
interests" since that question had not been raised. 486 F.2d at 1325.
197. 58 F.R.D. 86 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
198. Id. at 91. Beyond a requirement of proof of individual reliance, possible asser-
tion of one or more affirmative defenses against various individuals in the class may also
defeat class certification. See White v. Deltona Corp., 66 F.R.D. 560 (S.D. Fla. 1975);
Lukenas v. Bryce's Mountain Resort, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 69 (W.D. Va. 1975).
199. 58 F.R.D. at 90. The Act expressly authorizes the remedy of rescission. 15
U.S.C. § 1703(b) (1970). See text accompanying notes 208-09 supra. For particular
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Subsequently, another federal district court refused to certify a class action
in Young v. Trailwood Lakes, Inc.,200 primarily because some members of
the class sought damages and some sought rescission. The court found that
the conflicting remedies sought would thwart "effective administration of the
class action."'20 1
Pleadings and Proof. As one would expect, courts have generally required
the pleadings to conform to the substantive elements of the statutory cause
of action or defense. For example, the plaintiff in Rockefeller v. High Sky,
Inc.20 2 alleged the developer's failure to provide a timely effective property
report pursuant to section 1703, and sought the rescission remedy provided
by section 1703(b). Because section 1703(b) granted the absolute right
to rescind in that circumstance, defendant's affirmative answer that it had
"substantially complied" with the Act raised no triable issue.20 3 Similarly, the
Act does not require reliance on omissions from the property report;2 0 4 hence,
a complainant should not be required to allege reliance, and lack of
reliance should not constitute a defense.
The complaint's allegations must, however, strictly conform to those
particular causes of action recognized by the Act. In Campbell v. Glacier
Park Co.20 5 the developer decided, after plaintiff had purchased the lot, to
include a recreational facility within the subdivision. In compliance with
the Act, the developer amended the filed statement of record and property
report. Plaintiff contended that constructing the facility and amending the
filings violated the "purpose and spirit" of the Act. No allegations of fraud,
misrepresentation, or nondisclosure were made. Finding that the Act only
authorized claims based on misrepresentation or nondisclosure, and that no
cases granting rescission, see Rockefeller v. High Sky, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Pa.
1975) and Hall v. Bryce's Mountain Resort, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 165 (W.D. Va. 1974).
200. 61 F.R.D. 666 (E.D. Ky. 1974).
201. Id. at 667. Young generally expressed a negative attitude toward class actions
under the Act. For example, the court found that the individual claims of damages
were not so small as to preclude individual litigators. The court also found that the
proposed class represented "an easily identified and located assemblage of property
holders" that could be easily joined for suit. Id. at 668.
202. 394 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
203. Id. at 304-05. See generally United States v. Del Rio Springs, Inc., 392 F.
Supp. 226 (D. Ariz. 1975).
204. See Hoffman v. Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 86 (M.D. Pa. 1973). The court
in Hoffman analogized the Act to the federal securities acts which had been construed
not to require a plaintiff to allege actual reliance on an omission in a prospectus. Id.
at 90. A case which provided such an interpretation of the securities law was Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
205. 381 F. Supp. 1243 (D. Idaho 1974).
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such claims had been asserted, the federal district court dismissed the com-
plaint. 206
Statute of Limitations. The statute of limitations provision contained in
section 1711 has been interpreted as being two years. In Hall v. Bryce's
Mountain Resort, Inc.,20 7 a district court ruled that any rescission claim
based on section 1703(b) must be filed within two years. The ruling in
Hall was followed in Meihorn v. Amrep Corp.208 OILSR has conformed to
these two rulings.20
9
Melhorn also addressed the critical issue of estoppel from assertion of
the statute of limitations. The plaintiff purchasers filed a complaint slightly
more than two years -after the date of purchase. The purchasers admitted
that the two year statute had run, but unsuccessfully urged the court to estop
the developer from asserting it. The court noted that estoppel will be recog-
nized only when defendant deceives plaintiff about the length of the statute
or when plaintiff is "lulled" into forebearing a prompt assertion of his
claims. The developer was found not to have induced a delay in suit, but
rather had been, at most, ambivalent to the purchasers' complaints. The
court ruled that such action was not sufficient to estop the developer from
asserting the statute of limitations.
210
Administrative Sanctions. Concurrent with the foregoing legal remedies,
OILSR may also employ a battery of administrative sanctions. A suspension
may issue prior to a filing becoming effective (pre-effective) whenever the
office receives a statement of record filing, or any amendment filing, that is
on its face incomplete or inaccurate in any material respect. 21' The suspen-
sion will prevent a filing from becoming automatically effective 212 and will
render the developer liable for civil and criminal action if he proceeds with
the promotion.
206. Id. at 1249. As a subsidiary matter, the district court also found that the
cause of action was not dependent on the amount of monetary damage alleged, but
rather that the federal question under the Act sufficed for federal jurisdiction. Id. at
1247.
207. 379 F. Supp. 165 (W.D. Va. 1974).
208. 373 F. Supp. 1378 (M.D. Pa. 1974). OILSR did not formally intervene in
either case, but did file a memorandum of law in Hall which the plaintiffs adopted.
209. Telephone interview with Richard Heiderman, Special Ass't to the Deputy
Adm'r, OILSR, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 14, 1977).
210. 373 F. Supp. at 1381-82.
211. 15U.S.C.§ 1706(b) (1970);24C.F.R. § 1710.45(a)(1) (1976).
212. Absent a suspension, a statement of record becomes automatically effective 30
days after filing. 15 U.S.C. § 1706(a) (1970); 24 C.F.R. § 1710.21(a) (1976). To
toll the. 30-day period, the suspension notice must actually be received by the developer.
See Lake Chapparell, OILSR No. 0-3557-18-20.
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OILSR may also issue a suspension notice after a filing has become
effective (post-effective) if the office believes that a filed statement of
record contains an untrue assertion or a material omission, if a developer re-
fuses to cooperate with an investigation to determine whether a statement of
record is accurate, or if the agency receives any amendment to an effective
statement of record.218
A pre-effective suspension is operative immediately upon receipt of
notice. A post-effective suspension requires an affirmative order to take
effect, but such order may be issued 15 days after notice unless a
hearing is requested by the developer. 214  The pre-effective suspension
automatically lifts 30 days after a corrective amendment is filed, un-
less OILSR notifies the developer of additional deficiencies in the amend-
ment. A post-effective suspension will terminate upon OILSR's receipt of
corrective material and its determination that such material is effective. 215
Supplementing its legal and formal administrative prerogatives, OILSR
actively pursues a policy of encouraging informal administrative compromises
to remedy alleged violations. Although OILSR expressly disclaims the
power to act as attorney on behalf of purchasers, 216 the chief objective in
negotiating such settlements is, in fact, to assist the purchaser in effecting
rescission of his contract and in obtaining restitution. 217
The typical administrative settlement requires several steps. Whenever
OILSR suspects that a developer has made pre-effective sales, the office will
routinely request that the developer furnish an affidavit listing the names
and addresses of all purchasers. 218  Upon receipt of the affidavit, OILSR
will offer an "administrative settlement, ' 219 under which OILSR will take
213. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1706(b)-(e) (1970); 24 C.F.R. § 1710.45(b) (1976).
214. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.45(b)(1) (1976).
215. Id. § 1710.45(b) does not provide for a "thirty day rule" to govern cor-
rective amendments for post-effective suspensions and therefore actual correction, rather
than the mere filing of a corrective amendment, is required. Cessation of the suspen-
sion is also conditioned upon an affirmative OILSR order, which OILSR "shall" issue
upon compliance. Id.
216. See Letter from John McDowell to Yvonne Edwards (Jul. 30, 1975), Port Lucie,
OILSR No. 0-0025-09-11.
217. See, e.g., Letter from Alan J. Kappeler, Assistant Deputy Administrator,
OILSR, to 0. James Hunt (Jul. 24, 1975), Trailwood Lakes, OILSR No. 0-2302-20-32.
However, due to its lack of power to act as attorney, OILSR carefully characterizes its
settlements as a means of "disclosure." See, e.g., Letter from Alan J. Kappeler, Assist-
ant Deputy Administrator, OILSR, to Frederick Lorig, Esquire (Dec. 16, 1974), Del
Monte Forest, OILSR No. 0-3263-04-590 (the purpose of the settlement is to assure
that "purchasers. . . be apprized of their rights .... ").
218. If the developer does not immediately comply with that requirement, OILSR
will enforce the request through an administrative subpoena.
219. See, e.g., Letter from John McDowell to Mr. Scruby (Jul. 31, 1975), Jackson-
ville South, OILSR No. 4-5197-09-482.
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no further action provided the developer informs each purchaser,220 by
certified mail, that the sale was not in compliance with the Act. The non-
compliance notice must offer to rescind the sales contract and to refund all
monies paid under the contract. 22 1  OILSR then requests that a form affi-
davit be submitted attesting that the letters were sent to all pre-effective
purchasers.
Should the developer fail to consummate his "offer," OILSR has no
regulatory authority to order restitution,22 2 but has successfully sought
affirmative injunctions to do So. 2 2 3 Instead, OILSR usually advises the ag-
grieved purchaser to enforce his statutory rights through legal action. 224
Should a developer refuse to make the offer, OILSR will mail its own letter
to inform purchasers of their statutory right to rescind.2 25 OILSR's authority
to make this mailing was recently upheld by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia.226
The OILSR remedial policy toward consumer complaints is limited. Upon
receipt, OILSR will either forward a complaint to the developer requesting
220. Purchasers who have subsequently sold their lots to third parties are excepted
from notification. See Letter from John McDowell to David Douglas and James Pike
(Jul. 23, 1975), Pine Hill Estates, OILSR No. 3-0895-03-7. This exclusion is question-
able, since an aggrieved purchaser may sue for damages in the amount of the difference
between the purchase price plus cost of improvements and "the price at which such lot
shall have been disposed of in a bona fide market transaction.... ".15 U.S.C. § 1709
(c)(2) (1970).
221. OILSR maintains that the purchaser's right of rescission is absolute. See Letter
from John McDowell to Ben E. Jarvis (Jul. 30, 1975), East Shore Estates, OILSR No.
0-3796-49-592. Further, "all monies" is interpreted by OILSR to include all payments
of "principal and interest, taxes, special assessments, property owners' association dues,
and [the reasonable cost of improvements]." See Letter from John McDowell to Fred-
erick Lorig, Esquire (Apr. 24, 1974), Del Monte Properties, OILSR No. 0-3263-04-
590.
222. See Letter from John McDowell to Geordie Prince (Jul. 23, 1975), Country
Club Estates, OILSR No. 4-0556-01-4. Although OILSR has no power to dictate the
payment schedule of the restitutionary refund, it has on occasion suggested compromise
payment schedules, usually involving full restitution within 90 days. See, e.g., Letter
from John McDowell to Jimmy Reeves (Jul. 31, 1975), Rainbow Mountain Overlook,
OILSR No. 2-1304-38-112.
223. See HUD News, Jul. 31, 1975. To date there are no reported cases on this
point, but a restitution order was issued in Lynn v. Beard Land Co., No. Ty 74-273-CA
(E.D. Tex., July 25, 1975).
224. See, e.g., Letter from John McDowell to Richard Childress (Jul. 29, 1975),
Ranch Estates, OILSR No. 2-1003-03-36; Letter to Robert McGhee, Esquire (Jul. 25,
1975), Forest Acres Unit I, OILSR No. 0-3265-02-641.
225. See, e.g., Letter from John McDowell to Thomas E. Lea (Jul. 31, 1975), Valley
View Acres, OILSR No. 0-3717-33-62.
226. Colonial Discount Corp. v. Hills, No. 75-1599 (D.D.C. Jan. 5, 1976).
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an explanation 227 or suggest remedial action. 228  If the complainant pro-
vides convincing documentation in contradiction of the filed property report,
the agency may even move to suspend the statement of record. 229 Where the
developer denies the complaint, however, the normal OILSR response is to
declare the issue to be an irreconcilable factual dispute requiring private
litigation. 230  OILSR's main concern appears to be with enforcement of
registration requirements with little effort given to remedying actual fraud.
Bankruptcies of land developers have posed especially vexing problems for
consumers. Notwithstanding lack of formal standing to intervene in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, 231 OILSR has conducted an active informal campaign
to assist purchasers in asserting their rights when developers go bankrupt.
The office corresponds with judges and trustees to express concern about the
treatment of purchasers 232 and to advise that purchasers who void their con-
tracts pursuant to section 1703(a) have priority claims against the bankrupt
estate.233 Although this latter position appears sound when the voidance is
based on fraud, there is little basis for this conclusion in cases involving
merely unregistered sales.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
A number of proposals can be offered as possible remedial amendments
to existing law and policy. An initial suggestion would be to require all
Exemption Advisory Opinions (EAO's) to be indexed and made generally
available. To date, no OILSR material is topically indexed. Even a min-
227. See OILSR Form Letter "F."
228. See, e.g., Letter from Alan J. Kappeler, Assistant Deputy Administrator, OILSR,
to Stuart Marshall Bloch (Jul. 16, 1975), Westwood Shores, OILSR No. 0-2222-49-
129.
229. See, e.g., Hidden Acres Estates, OILSR No. 0-3931-49-615.
230. Cf. Letter from John McDowell to Leo Kissner (Jul. 30, 1975), Diamondhead,
OILSR No. 0-3661-49-442. For this purpose, OILSR Form Letter "L" was devised,
advising of OILSR's inability to sue on a purchaser's behalf and suggesting that the pur-
chaser seek legal advice. See also Attachment A to Memorandum from John McDowell,
Acting Administrator, OILSR, to Carla Hills, Secretary of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (Jul. 8, 1975), admitting that complaints "usually [involve]
factual disputes which we do not attempt to resolve."
231. See Memorandum from Richard Heidermann, Special Assistant to the Deputy
Administrator, OILSR, to John McDowell, et al. (Nov. 12, 1974), on file at OILSR).
232. See, e.g., Letter from John McDowell to John McLaughlin, Trustee (Jul. 22,
1975), Diamondhead Lake and Country Club, OILSR No. 0-2153-16-4.
233. See Memorandum from Richard Heidermann, supra note 231. Where fraud has
induced a sale, the equitable remedy of a constructive trust is appropriate. D. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON REMEDIES § 9.4 (1973). When that claim is invoked, the claimant
should obtain a preference over other creditors. Id,
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imal "regulations construed" index for EAO's would be of great assistance
to administrators, practitioners, and scholars. Additionally, significant
EAO's should be published in the Federal Register. At present, the only
service is an incomplete index published in the Land Development Law
Reporter. EAO's should also be restructured to incorporate precedential
rulings. Such opinions will -assist interested parties in noting changes in
policy and help prevent confusion engendered by widely divergent and con-
flicting agency rulings. When applicable, OILSR enforcement policies also
should be noted.
A second suggestion is that the Act should be amended to require states
to accept OILSR statements of record and property reports. This will
obviate the need to submit duplicative filings to the state and federal govern-
ments. Since the states may legitimately desire to regulate federally exempt
offerings, states should always have the prerogative of requiring additional
disclosure or implementing more rigorous substantive regulation. 234 The Act
should also be amended to grant standing to OILSR to intervene on be-
half of purchasers in any bankruptcy proceeding affecting a subdivision
within its jurisdiction.
A third suggestion is that the instructions for all disclosure filings be
amended to require submission of advertising and promotional material
currently in use, copies of any written or printed sales material, texts of all
electronic or telephonic promotional messages, and facsimiles or photo-
graphs of all visual materials. This proposal would assist OILSR in
ascertaining the scope of any pre-effective sales violations and would assist
processing of exemption order filings. Additionally, it would assist enforce-
ment of the advertising regulations by making all advertising material readily
available for OILSR review. Since the advertising material would be deemed
part of the statement of record, any substantial discrepancy between the
advertising and the balance of the statement would justify a suspension under
regulation 1710.45. This would correct the remedial hiatus present under
current regulations.
Two final suggestions are that Congress should amend the Act to exempt
statements of record and exemption filings from the provisions of NEPA,
and regulation 1710.11 should be amended to require an annual filing,
where the facts warrant, stating that no lots were sold during the calendar
year.
234. Certain states have enacted tough regulatory statutes that impose stricter sub-
stantive regulations than those accompanying the Act. See, e.g., the Washington State
Camping Club Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.105.010 et seq. (1974).
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V. CONCLUSION
Since 1969, the administration of the Act by OILSR has produced some
impressive statistical results. 23 5  However, these figures are countered by
such unflattering statistics as the burdensome costs of compliance with the
Act. It is too soon to take a position on whether the ultimate value derived
from the Act is worth the monetary and social costs of its administration, al-
though one previous Administrator has publicly expressed doubt concern-
ing the validity of full disclosure as a form of consumer protection.2 36
Regardless, one clear fact emerges: after six years, both the Act and the
OILSR exist as significant forces that spell potential ruin to careless develop-
ers and salvation to unwary buyers. Consequently, it behooves consumers,
developers, and the bar to become fully educated about the structure, pur-
poses, and implications of OILSR and the Act. Any lesser precaution is an
invitation to liability.
Ronald A. Johnston
235. For example, over 7,000 subdivisions have been registered pursuant to the Act.
236. HUD News, Jan. 3, 1973, reprinted in 1 LAND DEV. L. REP. at C-58, 59. See
also Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and the Federal Securities Laws, 71
COLUM. L. REv. 118, 123 (1971).
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